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I. INTRODUCTION

On November 1, 2000, a Joint Resolution was introduced in
Congress proposing a constitutional amendment to change the Article II system of electing the President and Vice President' by abolishing the Electoral College. 2 Acknowledging the fact that "there
have been more congressionally proposed constitutional amendments on this subject than any other,"3 the sponsoring Senator
noted that the issue "could become supremely important in a few
days," because "we have the possibility that the winning candidate
for President might not win the popular vote in our country. '4 One
prominent legal scholar has described the mere possibility of such
an event as "a constitutional accident waiting to happen. 5
Six days later, on election day 2000, the Senator proved to be
a prophet (the issue was not fully resolved for over a month).6 Governor George W. Bush won the presidency with 271 electoral votes,
despite Vice President Al Gore tallying more popular votes.7 The
possibility of a split between the electoral vote and the popular vote
moved from the province of mere academic speculation to political
reality,8 and the Electoral College debate moved with it to the fore-

1. "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
2.
2. S.J. Res. 56, 1061h Cong. (2000); 146 CONG. REC. S11494-04 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Durbin). The amendment would replace the apportionment of electors among
the states with a direct national popular vote. Id.
3. 146 CONG. REC. S11494-04 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
4.

Id.

5. Akhil Reed Amar, A ConstitutionalAccident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
143, 143 (1995).
6.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 1 (2001) ("For the first time in over a century, the presi-

dential election was not decided in the first week of November.").
7. Then-Governor Bush won 271 electoral votes, or 51% of the total, but only won 47.88%
of the total number of popular votes cast. See NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION,

OFFICIAL

RESULTS

OF

THE

2000

ELECTION,

at

http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). Vice President Gore
won 269 electoral votes, and 48.40% of the total number of popular votes. Id. While still not a
majority, his popular vote total exceeded that of Then-Governor Bush by over 300,000. See id.
8. NEIL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 116 (1981) ("Careful analysis shows that the danger of an electoral college misfire is not just historical but immediate in
any close contest.").
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front of public consciousness. 9 From the media to politicians to
scholars, no one seemed without an opinion on whether the Electoral College should be totally discarded, or meticulously preserved.10
This Note does not attempt to make any judgments on the
value of the Electoral College as an institution. Whether as a constitutional procedure the Electoral College ought to be preserved,
altered, or eliminated is a question left for other scholars to address. Instead, this Note analyzes legal issues that would confront
any attempt to change the Electoral College by lawsuit or legislation.11 It will do so by comparing the historical underpinnings of
the institution to the legal status of the electoral voting systems
currently practiced in the states. The analysis will focus on two
separate, but ultimately related, areas of inquiry: (1) the inception
of the Electoral College as a product of the Constitutional Convention, and (2) how that origin relates to possible challenges to the
"winner-take-all" allocation of electoral votes, or what is commonly
known as the "unit rule."1 2 This Note examines the Electoral College debate in light of two recent developments: the controversial
2000 election and the decision in Bush v. Gore,13 and the Supreme
14
Court's recent jurisprudence on state sovereignty.
The Constitution leaves the decision on how to allocate its
electoral votes completely to the discretion of each state.15 There
are a number of different methods from which the states could
16
choose; an overwhelming majority of states employ the unit rule.

9. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Election Quandary Prompts Pop Civics Test, N.Y. TI?,IES, Nov. 9,
2000, at B8.
10. In the wake of election day, newspapers devoted lead editorials to the Electoral College,
politicians declared their stance, and leading scholars rushed to contribute op-ed pieces commenting on the institution. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at A19; The Case for the ElectoralCollege, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 19, 2000,
at A34; Charles Fried, How to Make the President Talk to the Local Pot"Why We Need to Keep the
Electoral College, N.Y. TIMS, Nov. 11, 2000, at A19; Dean B. Murphy, In Upstate Irctory Tour,
Mrs. Clinton Says Electoral College Should Go, N.Y. TwMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at B1.
11. See, e.g., Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President Minority Vote Dilution and
the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935 (1996) (arguing that the Article HIdelegation to the
states is not exclusive and does not preclude the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act).
12. The practice has also been known as the "general ticket." ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERAUSMl 48 (1994).
13. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
14. E.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Seminole Tribe v. Florida. 517 U.S.
44 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cL 2; see supra note 1.
16. Currently forty-eight states and the District of Columbia employ the unit rule. See
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 106
(1999). Maine and Nebraska allocate two electors to the statewide popular vote winner (repre-
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This method has become unpopular with many commentators and
has been the subject of much criticism. 17 Included in the bill of
charges against the method are that it amplifies the effect of the
imbalanced allocation of electoral votes, 18 and that it fails to "count"
the votes within a state that were cast for a losing candidate. 19 It is
also controversial because it is the mechanism that enhances the
possibility of having an electoral vote winner, and hence a president, who received fewer popular votes than the electoral runnerup.

20

Although the Electoral College has indeed been the subject of
hundreds of proposed constitutional amendments throughout history, 21 many, if not most, commentators believe that the possibility
of getting the required two-thirds of the states to ratify any constitutional modification of the process is highly unlikely. 22 That recognition forces critics of the unit rule to operate within the existing
constitutional structure, but there are still avenues by which to
seek change: altering the status quo through either federal legislation or judicial action. 23 Both a court challenge and a congressional
mandate to the states to change their unit voting schemes would
24
most likely be based on the Equal Protection Clause.

senting the two electoral votes allocated for the states' seats in the U.S. Senate), and the remaining votes are given to the winner in each congressional district. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
805.2 (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1994).
17. See generally PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8 (advocating the replacement of the Electoral College system with a direct popular vote); Hoffman, supra note 11 (arguing that the Electoral College significantly disadvantages minority voters).
18. Victor Williams & Allison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and its
Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic
PresidentialElection Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 205 (1994).
19. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 938.
20. Because the winner of a mere plurality within a state receives all of that state's electoral votes, a candidate can win a majority of the electoral votes by winning enough states, without even a plurality of total popular votes cast-as the events of 2000 have brought into dramatic
focus. See Toner, supra note 9, at B8. The so-called "wrong winner" possibility strikes critics as
undemocratic and countermajoritarian. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 8-9. Defenders
of the unit rule had dismissed the scenario as unlikely ever to happen, as an acceptable risk at
worst, and as a misnomer, asserting that the electoral vote winner is always the "right" one. See
JUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? DEBATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 20-28 (1996).
21. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S11494-04 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
22. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEOIS.
145, 151 (1996).
23. See Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 253; Michael J. O'Sullivan, Note, Artificial
Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2440-47 (1992) (advocating both
judicial and legislative challenges to the unit rule).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. There are two arguments that the unit rule violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, to be discussed in greater detail infra at
Part IV. One is based on the apportionment of electoral votes among states. See Williams &
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Despite compelling arguments employing the established
"one person, one vote" jurisprudence2 and Bush v. Gore,2G the practice of unit voting remains beyond the reach of a court challenge.
Furthermore, any contemplated congressional action interfering
with the states' use of the unit rule would be unenforceable, if not
unconstitutional.2 7 Not only does the Constitution make a clear textual commitment of discretion to the states, but the state role in the
Electoral College is itself an essential part of the larger federal system. Therefore, the practice of unit voting may be changed only by a
constitutional amendment or by the states individually.
This Note will focus on two themes: first, the Electoral College's origin and place in the constitutional order, and second, how
that order informs both the jurisdictional and substantive aspects
of challenging the unit rule. Part II of this Note will outline the
constitutional origins of the Electoral College, primarily through a
close reading of the original debates of the Constitutional Convention. In addition to providing a fresh, thorough interpretation of the
original record on the topic,2 Part II will establish the Electoral
College as a fundamental component of the larger constitutional
compromise between competing state interests-a compromise that
is still relevant today.
Part III will review the evolution of state practices culminating in the present system. Part III will also briefly discuss how the
unit rule operates in national elections today and the alternatives
that states have in selecting their electors. This analysis will show
that the determination to leave the method of appointing electors to
the states was part of the overall federal-state balance achieved in
the Constitution and that state discretion has functioned as a facet

MacDonald, supra note 18, at 243-50. The other argument is that the unit rule "disenfranchises"
voters who cast their vote for a candidate other than the eventual plurality winner. See
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 19 (2d
ed. 1975); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2440-47 (advocating both judicial and legislative
challenges to the unit rule).
25. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
26. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
27. Recent Supreme Court cases have held that even some legislation that might otherwise
be within Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be enforced against the
states if it violates their sovereignty. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding

that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violated state sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) violated state sovereign immunity). This point is discussed fully infra at Part V.

28. Most of the current legal scholarship on the Electoral College relies on older secondary
accounts of the Convention by historians and political scientists. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note
8, at 10-30.
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of the Electoral College through two centuries and twenty-seven
subsequent amendments.
After presenting this interpretation of the Electoral College's
origins, this Note shifts to an analysis of challenges to state practices that could potentially be mounted today. Part IV considers the
possibility of a court challenge to a state's use of the unit rule. Such
a case would most likely be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 29 Part IV will examine the "one
person, one vote" line of cases that have challenged electoral practices on equal protection grounds 30 and will consider whether this
analysis may be extended to the unit rule. While courts have suggested that it may not,3 1 the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment could prevent states from employing the unit rule has
not been directly considered. Next, this Note considers Bush v.
Gore, which might be interpreted as raising new equal protection
implications for the unit rule.3 2 However, even that decision does
not bring the Electoral College within the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Part V explores the constitutionality of potential congressional legislation attempting to restrict the employment of the unit
rule. The key obstacle preventing such action is the Supreme
Court's current understanding of state sovereignty. The resurgent
federalism in the Court's recent Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
33
decisions presents a newly developed (and as yet unacknowledged)
hurdle for legislative challenges to the Electoral College. This
brand of federalism accurately reflects the original understanding
of the Electoral College. The recent case law, while controversial,
definitely forecloses action by the federal government to constrain
states' electoral discretion. In concluding, this Note reasserts that

29. See Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 253.
30. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962).
31. Gray, 372 U.S. at 378 CThe inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the
result of specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent nu-

merical inequality ... ").
32. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000) CThe idea that one group can be granted greator

voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.") (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969)).
33. This connection between the Electoral College and sovereign immunity has not yet boon
made, perhaps since the scholarly literature on the Electoral College tends to flourish around an
election year, and the full implications of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence have
only been established since the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See also Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2000) (criticizing the Court for enforcing its "vision of constitutional federalism" by restricting the ability of Congress to legislate).
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the principle of federalism that underlies both the larger constitutional system and the Electoral College that it produced, protects
each state's discretion to employ the unit rule in the "Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct" 3 4 for appointing electors.

II. THE ORIGIN OF THE FEDERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Central to the role of unit voting in today's federal election
system is an understanding of the origin and subsequent evolution

of the institution. A simple snapshot of the current near-uniformity
belies the complex development of the constitutional system and
state electoral practices. 35 Reflecting this truism, it seems that almost no study of the presidential electoral system, for scholarly or
popular audiences, begins without some treatment of the history of
the Electoral College.3 6 Due to the wide variance in opinions among
the founders and in systems employed by the states in the gradual
shift towards popular elections and expansion of the franchise, history provides a rich source of quotations to support just about any
thesis on the Electoral College. 37 A deeper examination is therefore
necessary to locate the unit rule properly in the American constitutional system.
This Part will discuss the emergence of the Electoral College
system from the Constitutional Convention of 1787. It focuses on
the debates themselves, as they depict the framers' struggle over
the manner in which to select the President, what alternatives were
considered, and the solution that was finally reached.3 8 This contextual approach minimizes the danger of relying too heavily on selective citations from the vast contemporary commentary. 39 Further-

34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

35. Even the term "Electoral College" is a misnomer because the process is kept completely
within the borders of each state, where the electors "meet in their respective States" to cast their
votes. Id. § 1, cl.
3.
36. See, e.g., HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 69-96; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 1030; Josephson & Ross, supra note 22, at 151-55; Jack Rakove, The Accidental Electors, N.Y.
TMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A35.
37. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 85 ("Depending upon the audience... many statements

were made after the Convention purporting to explain why one provision or another of the Constitution would be for the good of the nation.").

38. Id. at 84 (stating that the Electoral College must be understood as a compromise if one
is to "appreciate the context in which the constitutional debate over presidential election took
place") (citing MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 166
(1913) (noting that "the compromise does not appear on the surface," but that "it was referred to
in the course of the debates")).
39. Given the extensive deliberations on the topic of selecting the President during the

Philadelphia Convention, it is possible to select a quotation expressing just about any opinion on
the matter, and present it as an example of the "framers' intent." But a source that is even more
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more, the majority of scholarship on the Electoral College undertakes no analysis of the Constitutional Convention record itself, but
instead relies on secondhand historical summaries. 40 In addition to
providing a fresh analysis of the primary sources, this study will
show that the story of the Convention, taken as a whole, shows a
more complex picture of the motives, controversies, and decisions
that operated to create the electoral system than most secondary
surveys recognize. 4 1 This knowledge is central to understanding
how the original system, and the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of it, will preclude any legislative or judicial interference
with the Electoral College without a constitutional amendment. 42
This Note has three objectives in undertaking such a historical examination. First, it attempts to dispel some of the myths and
generalizations that are commonly used to construct a critique or
defense of the Electoral College. 43 The complex operation of the current system requires more than cursory assertions about the framers' intentions or beliefs, or the political theory underlying early
state practices. 44 One popular theory is that the framers chose the
Electoral College because they did not trust the people. 45 A more
common scholarly assessment is that electors were deemed necessary in eighteenth century America because it was unlikely that the
people would be sufficiently informed of the character of men of na46
tional reputation.
However, these assumptions imply that the Electoral College
was settled upon because of concerns with popular electionconcerns that seem antiquated, undemocratic, and less relevant to
the modern eye. 47 The second objective of this Note is to show that
the Electoral College system, a system of allocating electoral votes

subject to abuse by selective quotation is The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). As a polemical series intended to garner support for ratification, The Federalist Papers are much cited, but less authoritative as to the purpose of the Electoral College. The
intent of this Note is to provide a more holistic picture of the complex process behind the final
product.
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
41. Besides the value such a study has in itself, the way in which the Electoral College op.
erates in the federal structure bears directly on possible avenues for challenging it.
42. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that the federalism embodied in the structure and history of the Constitution preserves the sovereignty of the states).
43. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 85.
44. Id.
45. Id. ('Advocates of direct election have justified their view that the Electoral College
should be abolished by claiming that the framers never intended that electors ... were to be
agents of the will of the people.").
46. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 21.

47. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 85.
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to the states and delegating the manner of selection, was a com-

promise finally agreed upon as an alternative not to popular election, but to selection of the President by the Congress. 4 Similarly,
the simplistic notion that the framers intended the state legislatures to select the electors, and that the adoption of winner-take-all
popular voting was a gradual, perhaps grudging, accommodation to
democratic tendencies, 49 is undermined by the diverse array of practices employed during the first half-century. 50
The fact that the Electoral College and the unit rule were ultimately pragmatic developments leads to the third, and most important, point: the compromise and its subsequent implementation
are deeply embedded in the federalist framework of American constitutional government. 51 Although the Electoral College was not
derived from a grand design of political theory, the political debate
that produced it was an essential part of the system produced by
the larger constitutional compromise.5 2 The result of this compromise is the existence of a state role in electing the President of the
United States 53-an inescapable fact in evaluating possible challenges to the unit rule.

48. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 19-20.
49. See EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS 15056 (2d ed. 1978) (describing the true advances toward democracy in the early nineteenth century,
as well as much of the mythology). The notion that the framers somehow settled on selection by
state legislatures as a particular preferred method implies, incorrectly, that the unit rule is out
of sync with the historical expansion of democracy over two centuries.
50. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29-33 (1892) (reviewing the wide variety of different systems used by states in presidential elections from 1788 to 1860).
51. Critics contend that federalism is either invalid or no longer relevant as a fundamental
reason for preserving the Electoral College. A recent HarvardLaw Reuiew note argues that federalism is not a sufficient justification. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate" The Framers, Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV.L. REV. 2526 (2001). The author contends
that the intent of the framers was to balance the interests of small states and large states. Id. at
2531. The author then undertakes a thorough empirical analysis to argue that the original large
state-small state issues present in 1787 are not reflected in the actual operation of the Electoral
College today. Id. at 2531-40. The author concludes that principles of federalism should not support keeping the Electoral College, since it "bears an imperfect resemblance to the Framers'
original design...." Id. at 2549. But, it is precisely the argument of the present Note that whatever particular issues were motivating the framers in Philadelphia, the Electoral College that
resulted from those compromises established a state role in electing the President, regardless of
whether the specific conflicts between large states and small states are relevant today. The Electoral College, therefore, is a cornerstone of the federalist system enacted in the Constitution.
52. Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia:The Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President,73 J. AN. HIST. 35, 57 (1986) ("Thus if political theory did
not inform the creation of the Electoral College, it provided the essential backdrop to the evolution of this new instrument of government.").
53. BEST, supra note 20, at 34.
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A. Distributionof Sovereignty: The "Great Compromise"
On July 16, 1787, after more than a month of intense debate
and little progress, the delegates in Philadelphia reached a compromise on representation in the legislature. Seats in the lower

house would be allocated according to population, but each state
would retain equal representation in the Senate. 54 This watershed
event at the convention has been lauded as the "Great Compromise"
that rescued the convention from certain dissolution and saved the
Union. 55 Celebratory rhetoric aside, historians recognize that the
agreement did indeed address the central issue of the convention,
that of balancing the competing interests of different states through
compromise over representation in the national government.5 6 It
was a pragmatic arrangement: small states preserved their role as

sovereigns through equal representation in the Senate, while the
proportional representation in the House gave leverage to the larger states who were further mollified by the exclusive origination of
57
revenue and spending bills in that body.
The rest of the Convention, espbcially the debate over the
method of selecting the executive, cannot be understood apart from
this primary question and the compromise that was reached. Debate over national representation exposed the major dividing line of
the convention, and the "Great Compromise" shaped the rest of the
session. 58 Indeed, the delegates themselves increasingly referred to

54. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
[hereinafter 2 RECORDS].
55. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 185-87 (1966). In her wellknown popular account, Bowen describes the "Great Compromise" as the turning point of the
Convention, after which the delegates felt a solution would-be reached on all other questions. See
id. Before July 16, however, the issue of representation in Congress posed such a threat to an
auspicious outcome that Washington wrote Hamilton that the crisis was alarming, and he "almost despaired." Id. at 186. "W]ithout the Great Compromise," writes Bowen, "it is hard to see
how the Federal Convention could have proceeded further." Id. at 185.
56. See FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 228 (1985) (stating that representation in the legislature was "the first and crucial question" due to the "connection between the law-making power and sovereignty"); JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 57-58
(1996) (describing pragmatic compromise as a "staple theme" of accounts of the convention).
Generally, the larger states such as Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York favored representation according to population because it would increase their leverage in the
legislature, while the smaller states such as New Jersey, New Hampshire, and the Carolinas
sought to preserve their equal role under the Articles of Confederation by emphasizing their
sovereignty. See MCDONALD, supra, at 228.
57. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 7. This was to protect the larger states, with most of the people and
most of the wealth, from being overtaxed by the Senate. See MCDONALD, supra note 56, at 236
(noting that the limitation was an important part of the compromise).
58. BOWEN, supra note 55, at 186.
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their subsequent agreements as modeled on that "crucial decision." 59 The most significant such concord to follow in the same
60
mold was the Electoral College.
B. State Roles in Selecting the Executive: The Electoral College
Compromise
The issue of selecting the executive first arose in the Convention on June 1, 1787.61 The "Virginia Plan," Madison's proposal
for a national government, 62 called for a "National Executive" to be
chosen by the "National Legislature."6 3 The response of the small
states was the "New Jersey Plan," which also advocated selection of
the executive by the legislature.6 Therefore, the assumption was
that the Congress would choose the "chief magistrate," and all subsequent discussion used this notion as a point of departurei5
Distinct differences, however, existed between the two proposals. The Virginia Plan allocated power among states in proportion to size, both in the legislature and in selecting the "National
Executive." 66 The New Jersey Plan sought to preserve the equality
of states that was the basis of the Articles of Confederation6 by allocating an equal representation to each state in both houses of
Congress. 68 Therefore, the states would have an equal say when the
"U. States in Congs." appointed the "federal Executive"-the difference in terminology from the Virginia Plan evincing a different vision for the nation, one where the states were still the primary sov-

59. RAKOVE, supranote 56, at 58.
60. Slonim, supra note 52, at 57 (describing the Electoral College as solving "a practical

problem" that faithfully reflected "the pattern of weighted voting that was an integral part" of
the Congress).

61. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 68 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
[hereinafter 1 RECORDS].

62. MCDONALD, supra note 56, at 204. The Virginia Plan generally reflected the interests of
the larger states by allocating legislative seats in both houses, and therefore power, according to
population. Id. McDonald notes that though Madison is commonly thought of as an "ardent na-

tionalist," he was "always mindful of the interests of his state and was rarely if ever willing to do
anything in the national interest which he believed to be inconsonant with the interests of Virginia." Id.
63. 1 RECORDS, supranote 61, at 20-22.
64. Id. at 244.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 68.

67. See U.S.C.A. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (West 2000). State equality was also the basis of voting in the Constitutional Convention.
68. 1 RECORDS, supranote 61, at 244.
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ereigns. 69 This underlying tension would manifest itself in the ensuing debates.
Even before the introduction of the New Jersey Plan, however, some delegates introduced a related but different set of concerns regarding selection by Congress. They feared that giving
complete control to the legislative branch would compromise the
independence of the executive. 70 Many believed that allowing Congress to select the executive would result in his being completely
dependent on the legislature. 7 1 Furthermore, the selection process
''72
would inevitably be "the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction.
These concerns framed the debate on the executive around three
factors: mode of election, term of office, and eligibility for reelection. 73 If the executive was to be dependent on Congress, some delegates feared that eligibility for reelection would make him completely beholden to the politics of the Congress, and that a longer,
single term was warranted. 74 Others, such as Roger Sherman, fa75
vored shorter terms with eligibility for reelection.
These separation of powers concerns prompted alternative
proposals for the mode of election. On June 1, James Wilson of
Pennsylvania declared that he was "in favor of an appointment by
the people" to make the executive and the legislature "as independent as possible of each other." 76 The next day he proposed that "the
States be divided into districts," where voters would choose "Electors" who would meet to elect the "Executive magistracy. 77 He
deemed this "an election without the intervention of the States. ' 78
John Dickinson of Delaware countered with a proposal that the executive be made removable "on the request of a majority" of state
legislatures, because he opposed "abolishing the State Governments
as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do." 79 Both proposals were

69. Slonim, supra note 52, at 37 ("[A]t the very outset of the convention, the large and small
states were at loggerheads over the method of selecting an executive no less than they were over
the composition of the legislature.").
70. 1 RECORDS, supra note 61, at 175.
71. Slonim, supra note 52, at 43.
72. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 29 (statement of Gouvernor Morris, criticizing the decision
to leave election to the legislature).
73. Professor Slonim describes the relationship between these factors as a "tripod, whore an
imbalance on one side disrupted the balance of the whole." Slonim, supra note 52, at 44; see also
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38 (1892).
74. 1 RECORDS, supra note 61, at 68-88.
75. SAUL K. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 346 (1962).
76. 1 RECORDS, supra note 61, at 68.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 80.
79. Id. at 77-87.
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rejected,8 0 but we can see from the outset that the mode of election
was seen as a function of the struggle over relative state power.
Wilson's proto-electoral college was primarily a departure from appointment by Congress.
The discontent intimated by Dickinson on behalf of the small
states came to the forefront when William Paterson presented the
New Jersey Plan on June 15.81 This crystallized the debate between
the large and small states over the nature of sovereignty in the republic. Though the method of selecting the executive was an important part of this conflict, that discussion was largely set aside until
after the delegates resolved the issue of representation in the legislature. 82 The composition of the Congress would be outcomedeterminative for the executive, as far as the relative power of the
states was concerned, because the framers contemplated that the
legislature would have some role in executive selection.8 When the
"Great Compromise" incorporated both proportional representation
in the House and equal representation in the Senate, the delegates
turned back to the issue of the executive, this time with a struc84
tural model for a balance between federal and state power.
Nonetheless, the resolution of the legislative structure gave
the state delegations an added incentive in debating the election of
the executive. While the larger states sought to limit any influence
out of proportion to population, the small states wanted to preserve
their hard-won equality in the upper house.8 5 The small states were
concerned that Virginia and Massachusetts would dominate the
election process and ignore the concerns of states like Delaware and
Connecticut. 86 Beginning July 17, the delegates turned vigorously to
the election of the executive, on largely the same terms as when the
issue had first been introduced. 87 Appointment by Congress remained the point of reference, but concerns about the independence

80. Id. at 78.
81. Id. at 244.
82. PADOVER, supra note 75, at 348. The issue was resolved in the "Great Compromise." See

supra Part II.A. One other method was floated by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who proposed "that the National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States" with each
governor's vote weighted according to representation in Congress. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 61,
at 175. Though soundly defeated, this proposal illustrates the wide array of alternatives considered, underscoring the fact that the debate was not simply about whether or not to trust the
people to make an informed choice. See id.
83. 1 RECORDS, supra note 61, at 244.
84. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 29.
85. Slonim, supranote 52,at 40.
86. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8,at 16.
87. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 29-35.
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of the office were now tied to the question of the proper federal balance-animated, as always, by the states' relative interests. 88
Additionally, a different compromise, concerning slave
states, was part of the balance struck on July 16. This agreement
mandated that slaves were to count as three-fifths of a free person
for representation purposes in the lower house. 89 This gave an advantage to the southern states, which were allocated representatives for chattel slaves with no political rights. 90 The three-fifths
plan established a natural alliance between the small states, with
power in the Senate, and the slave states, which had disproportionate leverage in the House. Each group would have benefited from
keeping the election of the executive in the hands of Congress. 91
Nevertheless, the voting on the different proposals tended to fall
along the large state versus small state pattern. 92 The bargain was
partially incorporated into the Electoral College by assigning a
number of electors equivalent to each state's representation in Congress.

93

From July 17-26, the issue dominated the convention. The
delegates began with the last method agreed upon-appointment by
the legislature. 94 Gouvernor Morris of New York preferred that the
executive "be elected by the people at large, the freeholders of the
Country."95 Roger Sherman of Connecticut countered that the people at large "will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and
besides will never give a majority of votes to one man."96 This sort
of statement is often cited from the debates in support of the proposition that the framers chose the Electoral College because the realities of eighteenth century America prevented the people from
being properly informed-considerations largely irrelevant in the

88. Id. at 40-45.
89. Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 208-10.
90. Id.
91. Slonim, supra note 52, at 41.
92. E.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 404 (showing the results of a vote taken over whether
to elect the chief executive by joint ballot in Congress; it failed, five votes to six, with the five
largest states voting together).
93. Id. at 497.
94. Id. at 401.
95. Id. at 29. Morris's advocacy of a vote by "the freeholders" shows that even those who
wanted election by "the people" had a different idea of the extent of the franchise than we do
today. See id. Though this sort of difference is what causes people to think of the constitutional
system as archaic and irrelevant, it seems to speak more to the fact that the framers who advocated systems were less concerned with who was doing the voting, than they were with how
much weight their respective states had in the process. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at
21.
96. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 29.
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twenty-first century.9 7 Continuing, Sherman reveals his true concern that "[t]hey will generally vote for some man in their own
State, and the largest State will have the best choice for the appointment. ' 98 Others voiced their opinions on both sides, the chief
concerns remaining lack of independence and "intrigue [and] cabal,"
if the choice lay with the legislature; and if with the people, the "extent of the country" and the specter of "the populous states" dominating the process.9 9 Two days later, after the delegates argued
again over the issues of length of term and eligibility for reelection,
the idea of popular election was raised once again. 0 0 This time, in
light of the seemingly unsolvable problem of independence from the
Congress, popular election was gaining support.' 01 Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut floated the first serious compromise proposal: instead of the "National legislature," the executive would be "chosen
by electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States" in a ratio
that gave the largest states three electoral votes and the smallest
states one. 0 2 Because it removed the election from Congress, but
preserved a degree of state participation, the delegations voted in
103
favor of the measure.
This agreement, however, was short-lived. Delegates were
troubled by "the extreme inconveniency [and] the considerable expense, of drawing together men from all the States for the single
purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate."10 4 Accordingly, on July 24
the plan was tabled and appointment by the national legislature
was reinstated. 105 But the next day, Madison spoke at length on the
issue. Noting that "[tihere are objections against every mode that
has been, or perhaps can be, proposed," he discussed the various

97. See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 36 ("Contrary to folk wisdom, the framers did not reject
popular election because of a fear that the people might fall prey to a demagogue. They worried
instead that in a provincial society, citizens would never be well enough informed to make an
effective choice without multiple and expensive rounds of elections.").
98. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 29.
99. Id. Sherman, George Mason, and Charles Pinckney favored the legislative appointment,
while Wilson and Morris spoke out in support of election by the people. Id.
100. Id. at 57.
101. Id. at 52-54. Paterson of New Jersey and Rufus King of Massachusetts both came out for
popular election, and suggested that electors be appointed by the people for that purpose. Id. at
55-57. The popular vote advocate, Wilson, was pleased that "the idea was gaining ground, of an
election mediately or immediately by the people." Id. at 55-57. Wilson evidently saw the use of
electors as a proxy for, not an alternative to, election by the people. Id. at 55-57.
102. Id. at 57.
103. Id. The Convention left the exact ratio for future discussion.
104. Id. at 95. At this stage, the Electoral College was conceived as a body that would meet,
deliberate, and choose a president--which would be more deserving of the "College" title the
state-based institution retains today. Id.
105. See id. at 95-109.
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problems presented by each alternative, and concluded that ap10 G
pointment by the national legislature was just too problematic.
Furthermore, election by the state legislatures or executives was
also objectionable because the very reason the Convention had been
called was the need to exercise some restraint over state governments. 10 7 Madison said that "[t]he option before us then lay between
an appointment by electors chosen by the people and an immediate
appointment by the people."' 08 He "thought the former mode free
from many of the objections . . . and greatly preferable to an appointment by the national legislature."' 1 9 Though he personally preferred election by the people at large, he recognized as problematic
"the disadvantage this [would] throw on the smaller States." 110
Other proposals were suggested as well. Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina advanced the idea of an election by the people,
where each voter would name three candidates, two of whom must
be from states other than his own, thereby mitigating the dominance of the largest states."' John Dickinson recommended that
each state legislature nominate one candidate, with Congress making the final choice." 2 Oliver Ellsworth proposed that the legislature appoint the executive for the first term, with reelection determined by electors appointed by the states."' These suggestions
failed to win acceptance, but they demonstrate that the tenor of the
Convention was primarily focused on the question of how to make
the selection palatable to the spectrum of state interests by preserving a state role in the process. Left with the default proposition of
selection by the national legislature, the Convention tentatively
agreed on a single seven-year term of service with no eligibility for
reelection." 4 The matter was referred to the Committee of Detail
for incorporation into the draft constitution.115 The Committee returned a report on August 6 declaring: "The President of the United

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114. Madison further noted the disadvantage popular election would give to the

southern states, which would lose the benefit of the three-fifths rule, but that as a southerner he
was "willing to make the sacrifice." Id.
111. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 116.
112. Id. at 115-18.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 128.
115. Id. at 120-21, 128.
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shall be elected by ballot by the Legisla-

Just as the election of the President seemed finally in the
hands of Congress, the small state versus large state debate
erupted once again, this time over the question of which house of
the legislature would hold the power.1 17 The larger states proposed
the report be amended to provide for election by "joint ballot,"
whereby the entire membership of Congress would cast votes together. 18 This gave the advantage to the more numerous lower
house, and hence, to the large states with their greater representation. 119 Connecticut's Sherman vehemently opposed this plan, since
it deprived "the States represented in the Senate of the negative
intended them in that house."'120 The smaller states advocated selection by separate ballots, where both houses would have to agreethe bicameral framework of legislative operation that was the basis
of the "Great Compromise."121
By August 24, the Convention was at loggerheads on the issue of state power. The Convention passed a resolution inserting
"joint," over the vehement objections of Connecticut, New Jersey,
South Carolina, and Georgia. 122 An attempt to have the joint ballot
tallied by state with "each State having one vote" failed. 123 Gouvernor Morris again raised his strong opposition to selection by Congress. 124 Several more proposals for the appointment of electors
were defeated. 125 Finally, the delegations agreed to postpone the
whole matter-possibly because of a veiled threat by some of the
smaller states to back out of the agreement that revenue bills were
to originate in the House, a provision the larger states regarded as
crucial. 126 The matter was referred to the Committee of Eleven,
composed (significantly) of one delegate from each state. 127

116. Id. at 185. (this statement was the first time the Convention used the title "President).
117. 2 RECORDS, supranote 54, at 401.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 402-03.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 410-20.
126. Earlier on August 24, David Brearly of New Jersey asserted that "[t]he argument that
the small States should not put their hands into the pockets of the large ones did not apply" in
the case of selecting the President. Id. at 402-03. In other words, it concerned all states and it
was thus important for the Senate to have a measure of control. See Slonim, supro note 52, at 50.
For the suggestion that this statement represented a "bit of backstage maneuvering," see
MCDONALD, supra note 56, at 250 (contending that New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland strate-
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When the Committee returned on September 4, it presented
the following plan: the President would hold office for four years
(with no mention of ineligibility for subsequent terms), along with a
Vice President. 128 To choose these officers, it stated that "[e]ach
State shall appoint in such manner as its legislature may direct, a
number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and

members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may
be entitled in the Legislature."'1 29 The report went on to describe
how the electors would meet in their states (not as a singular "college," though this misnomer survives), and cast votes for two persons, one of whom had to be from a different state. 130 It further provided for a contingency election by the Senate, in the event that the
3
electors did not reach a majority.' '
The delegates discussed this plan over the next three days. 132
Gouvernor Morris, a member of the Committee, explained that it
combined the most advantages of the various plans, with the fewest
of the drawbacks. 13 3 As an alternative to legislative election, the
system made the executive independent of the legislature, reduced
the danger of "intrigue [and] faction" by keeping the electors within
the states, allowed for reelection, and satisfied those who wanted
an election by the people by allowing states to choose that
method.1 3 4 Those popular votes, however, would be weighted by
state sovereignty, due to the two electors granted to each state for
its Senate seats. 13 5 The plan seemed to impress most of the dele-

gically withdrew their support for the Originating Clause, which they returned in exchange for
the other states' support of the Electoral College). See supra Part II.A (stating that the agreement to give the House of Representatives control over spending bills was a fundamental part of
the "Great Compromise").
127. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 425.

128. Id. at 497 (the first time the Vice Presidency was mentioned in the Convention).
129. Id.
130. Id. The plan left the conduct of those state electoral meetings for each state to decide,
subject only to the Constitution's requirement that they meet on the day appointed by Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c.3.
131. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 497. Though it is not in the record of the debates, McDonald gives credit for the Committee's idea to Pierce Butler of South Carolina, based on a 1788
letter. See MCDONALD, supra note 56, at 251 (citing Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler,
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).

132. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 497-98.
133. Id.
134. Id.

135. Id. at 500. Peirce and Longley argue that the compromise giving this leverage to the
small states "was not considered crucial at the time," because it was not mentioned in the floor
debates following the Committee reports, nor was it an issue in the state ratifying conventions.
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 17. They contend that the major concession to the small
states was the contingency plan that gave each state equal voting power. See id. The contingency
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gates as a workable solution. On September 5, seven attempts to
1 36
alter it were all defeated, most by margins of nine votes to two.
Interestingly, no mention was made at Philadelphia of the
fact that the plan left the method of choosing electors entirely to the
discretion of the states-in fact, it clearly committed the decision to
the state legislatures. 137 As is explained in Part III, states were free
to appoint electors in the legislature, to create electoral districts for
the people to vote, to run a statewide "general ticket" (the unit
rule), or to employ any other device. 138 Some modern commentators
assume that this means the Convention assigned this responsibility
to the states in order to avoid a difficult decision.' 39 This assumption, however, takes for granted the idea that the delegates would
have even thought such uniformity to be of great importance. 140 As
this discussion has shown, the central issue of the Convention, and
the one that drove the debate over electing the President, was the
extent of the role the states would have, not the identity of the voters. 141 Once the formal power structure of how many electoral votes
each state would cast was decided, the lesser issue of choosing a
method was left to the discretion of the states. The plan implicitly
recognized that the states would be exercising a degree of sovereignty by choosing their electors as they saw fit.
There had been several different suggestions for electors already proposed. Wilson's proposal made on June 2 called for dividing the states into districts; Oliver Ellsworth's plan called for the

plan was the subject of subsequent debate because the composition of the respective houses of
Congress made the selection of one or the other an irreconcilable issue in the central large state-

small state dispute. See id. When compromise was reached on the contingency plan, it likewise
subsided as a hot-button issue. See RAEOVE, supra note 56, at 265 C'Sherman's amendment
passed with hardly a word of debate."). The fact that on the apportionment of electors the Committee was able to find middle ground that was generally unobjectionable should not be taken to
mean that it can be dismissed as unimportant.
136. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 511-21.
137. Id.
138. See infra Part Ill.
139. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 24 CThis knotty problem, which would cause
endless debates and maneuvers in the state legislatures in the ensuing years, was completely
ignored.").
140. "No question was raised... that a single method, applicable without exception, must be

pursued." McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29 (1892). It was not for another half century that
commentators began to opine in favor of electoral uniformity among the states. See 3 JUSTICE
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1466 (1833). reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 557 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
141. See Lucius WVILMERDING, JR., THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, at xi (1958) (stating that the

reason the Electoral College provided such deference to the respective states was due to the wide
variance in the suffrage laws in the states-since every state had a different conception of who
would vote, the important issue for the Convention was how to distribute power among those

states).
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state legislatures to decide. 14 2 Elbridge Gerry continued to insist
that state governors choose according to a weighted vote, and Morris defended the Committee report by stating that it would please
those who wanted "an immediate choice by the people.' ' 4 3 It is reasonable to suggest that the Committee of Eleven delegated the

choice to the states not out of despair, but because (1) it recognized
that, with the diversity of opinions already known, the different
states might prefer, and should not be prevented from, employing
different practices; and (2) with the critical issue of how much
power each state would have in the election already decided, it may
have been deemed proper to leave the exercise of that power to the
states. After the report was presented on September 4, there is no
record in the debates of any discussion on the issue.1 44 The debate
remained centered on issues of relative state power.
The last facet of the system that caused major concern was
the contingency procedure. 145 With the electoral system already ac-

counting for the small states in the allocation of electoral votes, the
large states were unhappy with the Senate alone having the final
say if there was no majority. 146 George Mason voiced his "strong

142. 1 RECORDS, supra note 61, at 80.
143. Id.; 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 57, 109, 500.
144. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 24. It is possible, once again, to extract opinions from letters written sometimes decades later, and make a claim about "the framers' intent"
regarding the procedure the states would employ. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George
Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 556-57 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ('The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively in view when the
Constitution was framed and adopted"). But in the definitive record (based on Madison's own
notes) of what actually took place in the convention-the diversity of opinions before the plan,
and the complete lack of debate thereafter-indicates that no one method was universally favored when the compromise was crafted. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 511-21.
145. The procedure for contingency elections is also a popular subject for contemporary discussion on what the "framers' intent' was, presumably to undermine the relevance of the Electoral College by showing that the framers believed the process would normally result in a contingency election of the legislature. See, e.g., LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 21-22. Like any
attempt to divine the framers' alleged intent, there is evidence that some of the delegates be.
lieved that would indeed be the case: for example, George Mason's oft-quoted statement that
"nineteen times in twenty" the President would be chosen by the legislature. 2 RECORDS, supra
note 54, at 501. But there is countervailing evidence that many delegates thought otherwise,
particularly because the pre-Twelfth Amendment requirement that the elector cast two votes for
President, one of which must be for someone from another state, would serve to increase the
chance of a national majority for one candidate. Id. at 525. Abraham Baldwin added that "the
increasing intercourse among the people of the States" would make the contingency "less (and]
less likely." Id. at 506. Since the convention spent over a month trying to devise a better alternative than selection by the legislature, as this analysis has shown, it would seem unlikely that
they would settle for a system that would effect Mason's dire prediction.
146. Id. at 520.
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objection." 147 James Wilson discussed the balance between the
House and Senate, arguing that since the Senate already had authority over appointments of officials and judges, treaties, and impeachments, giving that body exclusive influence in a contingency
election would be too dangerous. 148 The last major compromise of
the Constitutional Convention occurred on September 6, when the
delegations agreed that if no candidate received a majority of electoral votes "[t]he House of Representatives shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President, the Representation from
each State having one vote." 149 This forms the basis of the current
Electoral College.
Once again, the Convention balanced the interests of the
large states by having the House decide, with an equality principle
to mollify the fears of the small states. This compromise directly
replicated the logic of the earlier, and more famous, decision to allocate representation in Congress according to a federal principle. 50
In its creation of the Electoral College, the Convention produced a
compromise that was essentially a pragmatic response to competing
interests, but one that was nonetheless a manifestation of the larger conflict between national power and state sovereignty that the
convention was called to address.'' The result may not have been a
grand product of political theory, but it was certainly the product of
an intricate web of interests and many complicated decisions. As a
package deal, it was ratified and operated to elect the federal executive of the United States.
Even historians who acknowledge that the Electoral College
was more than a scheme to keep the election out of the hands of the
people or the Congress, and that it was fundamentally part of this
system of competing interests, downplay the central importance of
that fact. Jack Rakove writes that since "the political logic of the
Electoral College almost exactly replicated the debate over representation," it completed "the framework of compromises and bargains the delegates now knew they were constructing." 52 He argues, however, that this underpinning is less relevant today be-

147. Id. The Virginia delegate objected to the dilution of his state's power that would occur if
the contingency vote took place in the Senate.
148. Id. at 500, 522.
149. Id. at 529 (later ratified as part of U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3).
150. Id. at 20; see also Joyce Appelby, Presidents, Congress,and Courts: PartisanPassionsin
Motion, 88 J. AM. HIST. 408 (2001) ("In crafting the mechanism for selecting a president the
convention delegates plunged into another one of their balancing acts.").
151. 2 RECORDS, supra note 54, at 533.
152. RAKOVE, supra note 56, at 89.
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cause it was based on the "dubious expectation that the division
between small and large states would persist beyond 1787." 163
Whether or not the particular issues that divided the small states
and large states, and motivated the delegations, did indeed fade,' 5 4
the actual interests that the delegates held to be at stake are not
what is most important about the story of compromise and balance
told by the Convention records. 155 The large state versus small state
conflict only dominated the Convention because the states were being asked to give up some of their hitherto complete sovereignty. 156
The crucial point is that the debates embodied the larger, and still
quite relevant, issue of what role the states were going to play in
the new federal system and its presidency. The compromise reflected decisions about how to allocate political power between
those states and the national government. The result ensured that
their different interests as states could be asserted and considered.
As the delegates were signing the proposed Constitution,
Benjamin Franklin made his legendary comment that the engraving on Convention President George Washington's chair portrayed
"a rising and not a setting sun."15 7 His optimism was informed not
by any idea that they had come up with a perfect system of republican government, but because, as the doctor stated: "I expect no better and because I am not sure that it is not the best." 15 8 In other
words, it was a plan that reflected a vast network of compromises
and one that would actually work. When the citizens, through their
respective states, ratified the plan it included this unique method of
electing the chief executive.
C. Ratification and Contemporary Opinions of the Electoral College
The foregoing analysis focused on recounting the story of the
actual debates in the Constitutional Convention, as that is the best

153. Id. at 268.
154. While party politics soon gained primacy, sectional issues certainly became paramount
in presidential politics in the nineteenth century, and the urban-suburban-rural factor might be
most important today, it can be argued that by structurally preserving the states in their sovereign capacities, there are still important issues derived from the competition between states as
corporate entities. See BEST, supra note 20, at 54; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND
CONTINuITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 7 (1971).
155. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 84.
156. Id. at 83 ("'The states were not paper entities dreamed up by some bureaucrat on a flow
chart. Upon winning independence from Great Britain, the states were sovereign, functioning
governments, each with its own history and culture.").
157. BOWEN, supra note 55, at 256.
158. Id. at 263.
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way properly to understand the complex set of issues that informed
the decisions made in Philadelphia.15 9 A fresh reading is more informative than relying on another abbreviated secondary account,160
or selecting isolated quotes from the delegates' correspondence or

from The Federalistto ascertain the "framers' intent." A fresh look
imparts a more complete sense of the context in which the Electoral
College was devised. 161 Furthermore, the selective use of quotations
from contemporary opinion, or from the debates themselves, obscures the fact that one could find another piece of evidence from a
different delegate directly controverting the proposition.
For example, different framers stated views at different instances about what methods they expected the state legislatures to
employ in choosing electors for the state. James Madison wrote in

The Federalist that the state legislatures "will, perhaps, in most

cases, of themselves determine" the election of the President.'6
Thirty-six years later, however, he recalled that "the district mode
was mostly, if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was
framed and adopted." 163 Alexander Hamilton, writing under the
same "Pubilus" nom de plume as Madison, repeatedly expressed his
belief that the President would be elected "by electors chosen for
that purpose by the people."164 With three different opinions posited
by two of the most influential framers on the same subject, it is

159. See James H. Hutson, The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENTr 152, 16268 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (noting that while using the "legislative history" of the Constitution is problematic, Madison's convention notes are largely reliable).
160. Though many books and articles about the Electoral College contain brief discussions of
the origins of the institution, they rarely examine the historical record itself, relying almost
exclusively on previous summaries. E.g., PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 10-30 (providing a
description of the record that is often cited by others).
161. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 83 C'Any notion that the agreements, compromises, and
principles that provided the foundation for the creation of our system of federalism are irrelevant
... comes at least 200 years late.").
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961). Madison
was not in favor of the state legislatures' selecting the electors themselves, instead preferring a
vote by the people; he may have been less than happy with the final arrangement of the Electoral
College produced by the Convention. See MCDONALD, supra note 56, at 252.53. Nonetheless, in
The FederalistNo. 39, he was defending the Constitution for protecting the "residual and inviolable sovereignty" of state governments, and he generally supported the balance struck by the
"partly federal, partly nationar' Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 213-14 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
163. Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23. 1823), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 556-57 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 336 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing as one of the limits on executive power the fact that he would be elected "once in four years
by persons immediately chosen by the people for that purpose").
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more productive and credible to rely on the actual record itself.
Perhaps all that can truly be agreed upon is that the Convention
records show no consensus on this matter, and hence, it was left to
the individual states to decide for themselves. The record also
shows that as part of the overall bargain struck by the Convention,
the Electoral College engendered little controversy in the ratification debates. 16 5 When Hamilton gushed about "The Mode of Electing
the President," he stated that he would "hesitate not to affirm that
if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent," because
"[i]t unites in an eminent degree all the advantages" of the different
systems. 166 Hamilton may have been interested mostly in selling
the Constitution to the New Yorkers who could ratify it. He was
correct in asserting that it was "almost the only part of the system,
of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure or
which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents." 167 In fact, only a handful of antifederalist writers made any
68
complaint about the Electoral College at all.1
Some would conjecture that this lack of comment perhaps
indicates some uniform assumption by the founders on the way it
would operate, or the notion that the device was simply an afterthought. 169 In light of the long struggle over the issue that took
place in the Convention, this Note suggests that the method received little attention in the ratification controversies because it
appeared to combine, in an unobjectionable manner, a balance of
competing interests with a degree of discretion reserved to each of
the states. It may indeed have been understood as a fundamental
part of the larger and more hotly contested issue of the role of
states as sovereigns in the federal union.

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIT RULE
Continuing the historical analysis, Part III will briefly
sketch the early electoral practices of the states from a very diverse
array of practices in the earliest elections toward the eventual
widespread application of the unit rule. The Electoral College also
weathered its first Supreme Court challenge in the nineteenth cen-

165. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-

1788, at
166.
167.
168.
169.

140 (1961).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 379-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id.
MAIN, supra note 165, at 140.
Id.
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tury. 170 A brief discussion of the unit rule as it operates today follows, along with some of the alternatives that some opponents of
unit voting would like state legislatures to adopt. Viewing the current status of the Electoral College in light of its intellectual origins
and practical development provides a more accurate understanding
of its integral place in the constitutional framework.1 71 Because the
state role in electing the President emerged from an intricate, compromise and developed over two centuries alongside the larger constitutional balance, it remains an essential component of the federalist underpinnings of the system.
A. Early State Practicesand the Emergence of the Unit Rule
The Constitutional Convention left the actual choice of which
method to use in selecting electors to the complete discretion of the
state legislatures. 1 72 The fact that the framers contemplated no uniform method is underscored by the incredible variety of practices
73
employed by the various states in the early years of the republic.
When the Supreme Court first entertained a challenge to a state's
choice of method in 1892, the Court provided a short but useful
summary of this history in order to support its holding that the selection was completely within the plenary power of the state. 74
In the first presidential election, five states chose their electors in the state legislature. 75 Four states chose by a popular vote,
but each by a different method: one by a straight general ticket
("winner-take-all"); one by dividing the state into special districts
with one elector each; one by nominating one elector in each congressional district from which the legislature would make the final
selection (plus two at-large electors); and one by splitting the state
into two units, each with a certain number of electors. 76 The remaining two states lost their electoral votes when their respective
state legislatures could not agree on a method.17

170.
171.
172.
173.

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
HARDAWAY, supranote 12, at 83-85.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29 CNo question was raised as to the power of the state to ap-

point in any mode its legislature saw fit to adopt, and none that a single method, applicable
without exception, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the constitution.").
174. Id. at 29-33.
175. Id. at 29.
176. Id. at 29-30.
177. Id. at 30. The states that lost their electoral vote were New Hampshire and New York.
Only eleven states took part in the election, since North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet
ratified the Constitution. Id.
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The second election in 1792 saw a shift towards direct legislative appointment, with nine states selecting their electors without
any popular vote. 178 Three states used the unit system, and two
states selected electors by district (using two different districting
methods). 179 One state used a mixed method of legislators meeting
by district and choosing three electors in each district. 180 In the
third election, seven states chose electors in the legislature, two by
four difthe unit rule, four by popular vote in districts (again, with
181
systems.
mixed
with
three
and
plans),
ferent districting
These first three examples should be sufficient to spare the
reader a recitation of the breakdown in every election until the
popular vote and unit rule became universal. In the early years, the
states employed a variety of different systems, and the spectrum of
methods was much more diverse than a simple "popular vote versus
legislature" dichotomy. 182 Between the various district plans, and
the mixed popular and legislative methods, there were almost as
83
many different methods as there were states in some elections.
The states certainly took advantage of the discretion granted to
18 4
them under Article II in determining their method of choice.
The trend, however, was toward adoption of the "general
ticket," or unit rule. 185 Thomas Jefferson, perturbed at having lost
the 1796 election partly because Virginia had split its electoral
votes, convinced the state legislature to adopt the unit rule. 186 His
victory in 1800 is evidence that aggregating a state's electoral votes
as a unit can operate to the state's political advantage. By marshaling all of the state's electoral votes behind Jefferson, Virginia forced
a tie in the Electoral College. By 1824, half of the states used the
general ticket, and only one-fourth still appointed electors in their
respective legislatures. 1 87 Aside from the political pragmatism be-

178. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 247. This trend, which occurred after the Bill of
Rights was passed, belies the notion that the framers intended to keep the vote from the people,
but were thwarted by the demand for democracy.
179. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 30.
180. See id.
181. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 247. Tennessee, having just entered the Union, divided the state into three districts, and the legislature appointed specific persons in each of the
districts to meet and choose electors. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 32.
182. Id. at 29.
183. Id. at 30-33.
184. See Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Va. 1968) (noting
that Virginia had historically used its discretion to select the method that gave it the best political advantage).
185. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 32.
186. Josephson & Ross, supra note 22, at 154.
187. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 247.
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hind the states' consolidation of electoral votes, 188 the move toward
the popular vote coincided with an expansion of suffrage and general democratic sentiment in the early nineteenth century.'8 9 By
1832, all states except one determined their electoral votes as a
unit by a popular election on a general ticket. 190
The states' respective Electoral College practices have
evolved over time under the basic framework of the federal balance
crafted by the Convention and the direct grant of discretion under
Article II. This Note concludes that those principles continue to
guarantee that liberty to the states today.' 91 However, there have
been several developments that have altered the overall constitutional balance in the intervening two centuries. 92 The first of these

developments, and most directly pertinent to the Electoral College,
is the Twelfth Amendment. 9 3 The Twelfth Amendment changed the

balloting system of the Electoral College by requiring electors to
cast separate ballots for President and Vice President.'9- The
Amendment preserved, however, the essential attributes of the Article II Electoral College by giving discretion to the states and allocating electors by congressional seats.195

The Reconstruction Amendments truly altered the original
federal-state balance. 196 Because their substantive reach has been

employed to restrict greatly the original powers of the states in order to expand protections of civil liberties, this Note will focus in
great detail on the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the

188. The political effect of having all the state's electors could be as easily accomplished by
having the legislature select a general ticket as it would by a popular vote with the unit rule.
189. PESSEN, supra note 49, at 155; ROBERT V. REMINI, THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF
ANDREW JACKSON 15 (1976).
190. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 32. South Carolina continued selecting electors in the legislature until 1860. Id. In 1876, Colorado chose its electors in the territorial legislature, on the eve of
its admission to statehood. Id. at 33.
191. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) CThe individual citizen has no
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and
until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to
appoint members of the Electoral College.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1); see also discussion
infra Part IV.D.
192. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, altered the original federal-state balance such that it can be held to
affect the interpretation of the powers granted in the original articles of the Constitution).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIl.
194. Id. The amendment was passed in response to the 1800 election, in which Thomas Jefferson tied with running mate Aaron Burr for electoral votes, since the original Article IHprovided that each elector would cast two votes, and the second-highest vote-getter would become
Vice-President. The 1800 election was thrown into the House of RepresentatAves, where the
Federalists almost prevented Jefferson's election. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 26.27.
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
196. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
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Electoral College. 197 The Seventeenth Amendment requires Senators to be elected by popular vote rather than by state legislatures. 198 It also changes the original federal structure, though its
implications for the Electoral College are more by way of analogy. 199
As the Electoral College operates today, all fifty states plus
the District of Columbia select electors by popular vote, and fortyeight states plus the District of Columbia use the unit rule.2 00 There
are many advocates both for and against the current system from a
normative perspective. 20 1 Some favor a constitutional amendment 2to
02
abolish the Electoral College in favor of a direct national election.
Other critics, perhaps recognizing the practical hurdles to amending the Constitution, favor reform within the constitutional system,
often suggesting replacement of the unit rule with some alternative
method of selecting the electors in the states. Such proposals include the "proportional method" (in which electoral votes are tied
directly to the percentage of the popular vote each candidate receives in the state) or the "congressional district method" (like that

197. See infra Parts IV-V. The primary component of the Fourteenth Amendment invoked
against the Electoral College is the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
198. Id. amend. XVII, § 1 C'The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.").
199. Since the Constitution has mandated direct election of Senators, it could be argued that
the Electoral College should similarly be interpreted to prohibit selection by the state legislatures. Id. But aside from the fact that the Seventeenth Amendment did not seek to alter presidential election systems, and that the legislatures' powers are still held to be "plenary," the fact
that "[h]istory has now favored the voter' makes the issue moot. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
104 (2000) (per curiam). It is useful to note, though, while comparing the Senate to the Electoral
College, that as long as the Senate continues to provide equal representation to the states, the
Electoral College's system of combining the principles of proportional representation and state
equality derived from the Convention remains relevant. And the equal representation in the
Senate will never change-it is the one paramount structure without which the Union could not
have been formed. U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.").
200. See id. amend. XXIII (authorizing the District of Columbia to select electors "in such
manner as the Congress may direct"). Maine and Nebraska employ a type of "district system,"
where each congressional district within the state chooses one elector, and the remaining two
(from the states' representation in the Senate) are allotted to the overall state winner. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 805.2 (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1994). Note that this is
different from most of the "district" plans that were employed by states in the first elections.
Those plans frequently called for the drawing of special districts just for the purpose of selecting
electors for President. See McPherson v. Blacker, 1,16 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1892). Therefore, the analogy
drawn by reformers in favor of the Maine-Nebraska system to the original practices is inapposite. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 11, at 1011 ("One of the principal virtues of the congressionaldistrict system is that it is firmly rooted in historical precedent.").
201. For the leading political science arguments in favor of the Electoral College, see gonerally BEST, supra note 20. For a prominent critique, see generally PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note
8.
202. See, e.g., PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 235-36.
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of Maine and Nebraska). 203 These are the reform proposals that
those who might mount a constitutional challenge to the unit rule

24
in court or Congress would seek to require states to adopt. 0

B. ConstitutionalProtectionof State Discretion
The Supreme Court issued its first ruling on the states'
power to choose the method of selecting electors in the 1892 case
McPherson v. Blacker.2 5 This landmark case established that, under the Constitution, the states have absolute plenary power to
choose the manner of elector appointment. 20 6 Ironically, it was a
party who was in favor of the unit rule, and was challenging Michigan's decision to abandon the unit rule for a district system, who
brought the case.207 Chief Justice Fuller held that the Constitution
"leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method" of effecting the state's power. 2 8 After reviewing the different methods
20 9
employed by the states before the unit rule became predominant,
the Court determined that Article II conceded "plenary power" in
the matter, so that a state could even replace popular election with
legislative appointment if it so chose. 210 Even though popular election had become universal in America, the question was "not one of
21
policy, but of power." '
Having firmly established that the states' discretion in the
Electoral College was derived from the federal structure and text of
the original Constitution, the Court turned to consider whether the
Reconstruction Amendments had altered that federal-state balance
so as to inhibit the states' unfettered power. 212 The Court held that
when a state chooses electors through a popular election, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the right to vote in that election. 213 As
for the structural matters of federal-state relations, Chief Justice

203. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 11, at 1011-15.
204. See infra Parts IV-V. The states are free, of course, to adopt any of these reform proposals on their own.
205. McPherson, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
206. Id. at 25.
207. Id. at 24. This underscores the fact that the issues examined in this Note are not so
much about the unit rule per se, but about the underlying structural issues providing for the
states' discretion.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Id. at 29-33.
210. Id. at 35.
211. Id. at 36.
212. Id. at 37.
213. Id. at 39.
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Fuller held that the amendment was not designed "to radically
change the whole theory," and that equal protection only applied to
prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out for discrimination. 214 The Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment has undergone tremendous evolution since Chief Justice Fuller's day, 215 and the modern relevance of this aspect of
McPherson must be reevaluated. 2 16 The importance of McPherson is
that it was the first, and remains the only, definitive Supreme
Court pronouncement on the Electoral College's delegation to the
states of the power to choose electors "in such Manner as the legis21 7
lature thereof may direct."
In fact, new life has been breathed into McPherson because
the case "loomed so large in the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
Election 2000."218 In addition to being cited in Bush v. Gore,2 19 the
case was examined in the prior opinion of 'Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board.220 The Court in that opinion affirmed
that in selecting electors, a state acts by "a direct grant of authority" from the Constitution. 22' Citing McPherson, the Court held that
the language of Article II made an unambiguous and complete
commitment of the power to the state legislatures. 222 Though the
Court was primarily considering the issue of separation of powers
within a state, rather than the structural federalism that is the focus of this Note, the recitation of the McPherson rationale in the
2000 election cases 223 has solidified the central premise that a state
is free to employ the unit rule, or any other method, in exercising
its discretion granted by the Constitution.
IV. CHALLENGING THE UNIT RULE IN THE COURTS
Having explored the origin of the Electoral College in depth,
and its place in the constitutional order, this Note will now turn to

214. Id. In other words, the Court held that equal protection did not implicate any of the options available to the state for choosing electors. Id.
215. In the area of voting rights, the Fourteenth Amendment has been expanded to guarantee the right to "one person, one vote." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); see infra Part

IV.B.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 5.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 5.
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an analysis of potential challenges to the unit voting system practiced by most states. There are four possible avenues for change:
constitutional amendment, unilateral action by state legislatures,
lawsuit, or federal legislation. 224 Since the first two options are
deemed unlikely to occur 22 5 (and are more the province of a norma-

tive evaluation), this Note will analyze the latter two options. This
Part will examine the issues of a challenge to the unit rule in court,
and Part V will consider a challenge in Congress.
This Part examines potential constitutional litigation by first
delineating the equal protection argument against unit voting. It
then reviews the "one person, one vote" line of cases that in the
1960s established voting as a fundamental right, and continues by

analyzing attempts to extend that logic to the Electoral College.2

6

It ends with a brief discussion of possible implications to unit voting raised by Bush v. Gore.227 The overall conclusion is that the
equal protection argument against the unit rule falls short of overcoming the same constitutional roadblocks that have prevented a
general challenge to the Electoral College.Y
The Fourteenth
Amendment does not alter the original federal-state balance2 so as
to remove the states from their constitutional role in selecting the
President. In addition to the Article II text, the system of dual sovereignty places a state's choice of the unit rule, or any other
method, above the reach of any judicial interference. Only unilateral action by state legislatures or a constitutional amendment will
alter the practice.

224. The constitutional foundation for the four avenues, while subject to dispute, would be as
follows. Constitutional amendments are provided for in Article V. State legislation to change its
Electoral College practice is permissible under Article II, section 1 ("Each State shall appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct... ."). A lawsuit could be contemplated under
Article H ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. . . arising under this Constitution). And
the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes federal legislation in section 5 (The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation....-).
225. Commentators deem an amendment unlikely because Article V requires the consent of
three-fourths of the states, and because none of the hundreds of proposed amendments on the
Electoral College since the Twelfth Amendment have succeeded. See Josephson & Ross, supra
note 22, at 151. Unilateral state action is not expected to occur because a collective action problem inhibits it. As long as other states continue to maximize their electoral influence by aggregating all electoral votes into a single state bloc, there is a strong disincentive--or fearpreventing a single state from abandoning the unit rule. See O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2443.
At least eight other states have considered following the lead of Maine and Nebraska, but none
have come close to passing such legislation. See Josephson & Ross, supranote 22, at 161 n.104.
226. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 288 F.
Supp. 622, 628 (E.D. Va. 1968).
227. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
228. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).
229. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
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A. The Equal ProtectionArgument Against Unit Voting
Regardless of the merits of any alternative method for selecting the President, the Constitution has been interpreted to place
the liberty of the state legislatures to choose the method beyond the
reach of a legal challenge on general majoritarian grounds. 230 In
addition to the textual commitment in Article II that the electors
are to be appointed in the states "in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct," 231 the federalist structure of the Constitution
contemplates a distinct role for the states in national elections, and
thereby places the Electoral College outside the framework of a
challenge on general democratic principles. 232
What remains for those displeased with states' use of the
unit rule is to make an argument not that the nationwide result is
wrong, but that the practice within a state violates a specific constitutional provision, so that Congress has or the courts have a basis
for altering the law. 233 Hence, the equal protection argument is that

the selection of the unit rule by a state violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of "one person, one vote," as interpreted by
the Supreme Court. 234 In the context of a court challenge, there
have been two theories suggested under which a litigant could
claim that the Electoral College violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 23 5 One is based on the apportionment of electoral votes
among states: that by giving each state two electoral votes for its
Senators, regardless of population, the formula gives unequal
weight to voters in different states. 236 This argument, however, besides not technically falling within the Fourteenth Amendment, 237

230. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 7 ("The constitution.., leaves it to the legislature exclusively.").
231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
232. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963) ("The inclusion of the electoral college in

the constitution.., validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality.").
233. Josephson & Ross, supra note 22, at 163-65 (describing proposed court and legislative
challenges to the unit rule under the Fourteenth Amendment).
234. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("[A]s nearly as is practicable[,] one man's
note in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."); Gray, 372 U.S. at 381

("[A]ll who participate in the election are to have an equal vote.... This is required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
235. Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 255.
236. Id. (arguing that the "malapportioned" Electoral College should be challenged because it
burdens the fundamental right of "one person, one vote").
237. Apportionment is not technically a Fourteenth Amendment problem, since the issue is
the equality of voters between states because of the national government's distribution, rather
than any action by the state. While Williams and MacDonald propose that "Etihe federal courts
could be asked to recognize that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
'amends' the structurally malapportioned electoral systems of Article II, section 1," they fail to
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is ultimately a structural concern that would require a constitu238
tional amendment.

The other argument is that the unit rule "disenfranchises" a
voter who casts her vote for a candidate other than the eventual

plurality winner. 23 In other words, critics argue that since the winner receives the entire electoral vote of the state, those who voted
for a different candidate are not represented in the Electoral College, and their votes are "counted only for the purpose of being discarded."24° While this very premise is subject to challenge on constitutional and general political science grounds, 24 ' the argument does
fit more accurately within the framework of a viable equal protec242
tion claim.

The theory of the challenge is that Article II's grant of discretion does not direct the use of a particular method, but the
243
method chosen must comport with the rest of the Constitution.
Therefore, a state's choice to employ the unit rule would be impermissible if the unit rule is indeed inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 In other words, the argument is that while the
states' discretion is constitutional, the particular exercise of that

remember that the Article II system was preserved in the Twelfth Amendment, which came after
the Fifth Amendment. Williams & MacDonald, supranote 18, at 255; see also Josephson & Ross,
supra note 22, at 165 (arguing that the claims of Williams and MacDonald are untenable). Only
the Fourteenth Amendment can be alleged to have "fundamentally altered the balance of state
and federal power struck by the Constitution" in the case of the Electoral College. Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).

238. The issue of apportionment of electoral power does seem to get to the heart of some critics' concerns with the system. See WILMERDING, supra note 141, at 97. It can also be argued that
the unit rule increases the voting power of the citizens of a state and exacerbates such disparities
of voting power between states. See John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical
Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304, 313 (1968) (using a quantitative analysis
to allege that the different ratios of voter-per-electoral vote in the different states results in a
disparity in what each person's vote is "worth"). Even so, the question of apportionment is not
one for the courts. See id. at 315-16. While the unit rule itself is not mandated by the Constitution (thus opening the door for a challenge), the apportionment of electors is unambiguously set
forth in Article II, section 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
239. See LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 24, at 19; Hoffman, supra note 11. at 938; Williams
& MacDonald, supra note 18, at 254 ("[A] state's winner-take-all system always disenfranchises
a minority of the voters ...').
240. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 938 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 n.12 (1963)
(holding that a county-by-county unit rule practiced in state elections was unconstitutional)).
241. See BEST, supra note 20, at 31-34 (arguing that according to the "federal principle." the
President is selected by the Electoral College as the result of separate state elections for choosing
electors, and that therefore the voters who supported a losing candidate are no different from
those in any other election).
242. Josephson & Ross, supranote 22, at 162-65.
243. Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 253.
244. Id. (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment "amends" Article II, section 1).
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discretion to employ the unit rule is not.245 The relief sought by the
actual and proposed lawsuits is for the courts to declare a state's
use of the unit rule unconstitutional and to require the employment
of a different method. 246 Though ultimately unsuccessful, this "disenfranchisement" argument is the one made by most critics 247 and
has been litigated on several occasions. 248 It is likewise the argument that will be compared against the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment later in this Part.
B. "One Person, One Vote" A FundamentalFourteenthAmendment
Right

In order for a court-state or federal-to interfere with legislative enactments, such as state voting procedures, and find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, there must be (1) an action by
the state,2 49 and (2) a valid inequality. 250 The unit rule by definition
meets the first criterion-while selected pursuant to the Constitution, the state legislatures are the decision makers. 2 1 The second
criterion is more of an open question. Those arguing against the
unit rule contend that the alleged "disenfranchisement" of the political minority in the winner-take-all determination of electoral
votes is an unequal treatment of citizens within a state, drawing
support from the line of cases developed below. 2 52 Ultimately, however, it is a question of constitutional interpretation, not yet fully

resolved, whether the structural inequalities found in the voting
procedures in these cases may be extended to the Article II discre-

245. Id.
246. Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
247. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 940 (arguing alternatively that the unit rule violates the
right of racial minorities under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Williams & MacDonald,
supra note 18, at 253-54; O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2440-41.
248. See Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966); Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968); Penton, 264 F. Supp. at 250; Hitson v. Baggett, 446 F. Supp.
674 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Lowe v. Treen, 393 So.2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
249. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (holding that even a private entity acting under the authority of the state is subject to scrutiny for violating the constitutional rights of
individuals).
250. See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (holding that a regulatory classification is valid if it is reasonably related to the purpose for which it was enacted, and
is not the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection).
251. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
252. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 8, at 111-12 (arguing that the unit rule's "massive dis.
franchisement' of voters "demonstrates its inherent inequality"). Defenders reply that since the
Electoral College provides for a system of state elections, the citizens who voted for a losing candidate are no different than the supporters of a losing candidate in any election. See BEST, supra
note 20, at 34.
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tion given to the states under the federal balance struck by the
Constitution.253

Even if the state action constitutes a valid inequality, a legislature's decision to employ the unit rule will receive only the most
deferential rational basis review, 2 4 unless a plaintiff can establish
that the method affects a "fundamental interest."2 5 If a fundamental interest is implicated, the state's action receives stricter judicial
scrutiny: it must serve a compelling governmental interest and be
narrowly tailored to provide the least inequality toward reaching
that end.256 The line of cases beginning with Baker v. Carr27 has
firmly established a general rule that voting is indeed a fundamental constitutional right and that the principle of "one person, one
vote" is the basis of our representative government.2
Prior to Baker v. Carr,the constitutionality of state decisions
on how to operate elections was considered a nonjusticiable political
question, reserved to the discretion of the political branches of government. 2 9 In Baker, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's
challenge to the scheme of apportionment for the Tennessee legislature was indeed subject to judicial review because it was within the

253. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 111 (CDespite the obvious intent of the framers, the historical context in which the principle of equal state representation was adopted, and the specific
design of the Electoral College as set forth in the Constitution, serious efforts have been made to
challenge the Electoral College, and specifically its general ballot feature, on grounds that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
254. Under rational basis scrutiny, a court will not invalidate state action as long as the unequal treatment of citizens is pursuant to a legitimate state interest, and the means of achieving
it are reasonably related to that end. Ry.Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 106. The practical effect is
that a constitutional claim will rarely prevail.
255. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 541 (1942) (holding that the federal courts could strike
down a state law providing unequal punishments for similar offenses because the sterilization
required by the statute affected the "fundamental interest" of procreation). Alternative to a finding of "fundamental interest," a court could use a higher level of scrutiny if it determined that
the inequality affected a member of a "suspect class" or classification, such as race. Id. This has
been applied to strike down electoral practices, but is not really at issue here. See Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that a state poll tax violated the Equal
Protection Clause). Matthew Hoffman argues that unit voting specifically violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of racial minority voters, but his argument regards it as a violation of
the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), that prohibits interference with voting rights of racial minorities. Hoffman, supra
note 11, at 937. This Note deals with the more general structural question of whether the Electoral College can be reached by the Fourteenth Amendment at all.
256. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.
257. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
258. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969). The actual language used by Justice Stewart
was that the fundamental principle is "one man, one vote." Id.
259. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (refusing to decide a state congressional districting dispute on the grounds that as a political question it was not proper for the
courts to intervene).
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scope of protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.260 In
establishing that voting rights were fundamental, the Court noted
the importance of "[a] citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary im261
pairment by state action."
Having opened the door for constitutional challenges to state
electoral practices, the Warren Court continued to expand on the
relationship of voting and constitutional rights. In 1964, the Court
ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to ensure that its congressional districts are roughly
equal in population. 262 According to the Court, the Constitution requires that "one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's"; otherwise, the state would be practicing "vote-diluting discrimination." 263 In finding voting to be a fundamental right, the Court deemed that "[o]ther rights, even the
264
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."
Later that term, the Court affirmed this reasoning in Reynolds v. Sims, striking down Alabama's legislative apportionment
scheme because it was not based on equal representation. 265 If this
"fundamental principle" was not preserved under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court stated, each citizen would be prevented
from having an "equally effective voice" in government. 266 Voting
was held to be a "fundamental political right, because preservative

260. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
261. Id. at 208.
262. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (holding that it was the "Constitution's plain
objective" to make "equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal of the
House of Representatives"). The reference to the House, however, limits the analogy to the Electoral College, since as has been shown, the Electoral College incorporates the representation
theories behind both the House (population) and the Senate (state equality). Id.
263. Id. at 8.
264. Id. at 17.
265. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964). The Court held that a state legislature must
be apportioned according to population, which has led commentators to draw the analogy to the
"malapportioned" argument against the Electoral College. See Josephson & Ross, supra note 22,
at 245. But the Reynolds Court itself was careful to distinguish the state legislatures from the
federal scheme of representation in Congress, from which the Electoral College apportionment is
derived: "The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress is one ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. It is one conceived out of compromise
and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic. Arising from unique
historical circumstances, it is based on the consideration that in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly independent States bound themselves together under one national government." 377 U.S. at 574.
266. Id. at 560, 566.
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of all rights,"2 67 and therefore equal protection guarantees would be
26 8
violated if a citizen's votes suffered "debasement or dilution."
This reasoning was further applied to state practices in
presidential elections in Williams v. Rhodes.26 9 In Rhodes, the Court
considered a constitutional challenge to an Ohio law that made it
difficult for third parties to place their presidential candidates on
the state ballot. 270 The petitioners alleged that this denied the
state's voters the equal protection of the laws. 27 1 The state claimed
that under Article II, Section 1, it had absolute power to place any
burdens it pleased on the selection of electors.2 2 The Court disagreed. While it acknowledged that the Constitution granted extensive power to the states on this issue, it stated that "granted powers
are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised
in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."273 The Court continued, "[n]or can it be thought that the
power to select electors could be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands.., we must reject the notion
that [Article II] gives the States the power to impose burdens on the
right to vote." 27 4 The Court held that "no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's command" against denying the equal protection of the laws.2 Turning
to the merits of the equal protection claim, the Court determined
that the burden placed on voters did not satisfy the "compelling in2 76
terest" test.
The Supreme Court has continued to hold, in its occasional
decisions on the issue, that "one person, one vote" is a fundamental
Fourteenth Amendment right,2 77 the application of which extends to

267. Id. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
268. Id. at 555.
269. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
270. Id. at 27.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 28-29.
273. Id. at 29.
274. Id. (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the Court's scrutiny extends to "burdens"
and "restrictions" that a state imposes pursuant to its affirmative grant of power under Article
11, in this case, restrictive procedural rules about who can be on the ballot. Id. It is not clear that
this scrutiny would extend to the manner in which the legislature chooses the electors. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 31.
277. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (affirming the Wesberry principle that congressional districts must be drawn in order to achieve representative equality, but upholding the
state's plan because it conformed to the principle "as nearly as practicable"); Moore v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969) (striking down a system that unequally distributed electoral power
based on counties).
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presidential elections. 278 The line of cases holding this has been the
basis for several court challenges to states' use of the unit rule, as
well as continued challenges suggested by scholars. 2 79 In addition to
the clear rule that voting rights are fundamental, and warrant
strict scrutiny if a valid inequality can be established, the logic of
Rhodes is especially appealing: Article II, Section 1 must comport
with the Fourteenth Amendment. 280 The next section will consider
the question of whether this analysis can be extended to the actual
manner the states choose for selecting electors. The courts that
have considered the issue have determined that it does not.
C. Equal Protection and the Unit Rule
Included in the Warren Court's "one person, one vote" line of
cases was the 1963 decision in Gray v. Sanders.28 1 This case provides a popular analogy for those who seek to challenge the unit
rule in the Electoral College. 28 2 In Gray, the issue was whether the
use of a "county unit system" in a primary election for state officers
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 283 Georgia had a system for
counting primary votes 284 that aggregated the votes by county, and
the winner in each county received, "winner-take-all," a predetermined amount of unit votes towards the statewide totals. 285 The
Court struck down this system as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it diluted votes based on geography. 286 In a

278. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983). The Anderson Court ruled that an

early filing deadline that prevented the independent candidate, John Anderson, from being listed
on the ballot violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 806. The state was subjected to strict
scrutiny not only for the impact on general suffrage rights, but because a presidential election
implicates a "unique national interest," where a state's action "has an impact beyond its own
borders." Id. at 794-95. However, like Rhodes, Anderson did not extend this scrutiny beyond

"state-imposed restrictions."Id. (emphasis added). In the context of the unit rule, it is not clear
that a legislature's choice of this method, granted by Article II, would constitute a restriction.
279. See, e.g., Hitson v. Baggett, 446 F. Supp. 674 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Williams & MacDonald,
supranote 18, at 254.
280. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
281. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
282. See, e.g., Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 247-49; O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at
2433-36.
283. Gray, 372 U.S. at 370.

284. It was the state's regulation of the otherwise private political primary election that
made it qualify as "state action" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 374.
285. Id. at 370-71.
286. Id. at 379, 381. Though Gray was decided before Wesberry, Reynolds, and Rhodes, the
reasoning was on the same principles as the "one person, one vote" rule articulated by those
subsequent cases. Id. at 380-81; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). The Gray Court

2001]

ELECTORAL COLLEGE UNIT VOTING

2137

footnote, Justice Douglas added that because of the unit rule, the
votes of those within a county who voted for a candidate other than
the winner were "worth nothing and ... counted only for the pur-

287
pose of being discarded.
Gray appears to frame perfectly an equal protection challenge to the Electoral College-if the unit rule is unconstitutional
at the county level, why not at the national level as well? Shortly
after the Gray decision, a group of reformers 2 organized just such
a suit in Delaware v. New York, 289 invoking the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to hear suits between states2 0 The petitioners,
on behalf of Delaware and twelve other States, alleged that the unit
rule denies the equal voting rights of those who vote for a losing
candidate by "totally canceling their effects when the state's entire
electoral vote is awarded to the winner," and by analogizing the
unit rule to the "internal denial of equal protection" found in
Gray.291 The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint per curiam
without issuing an opinion, 292 but other subsequent attempts at
challenging the Electoral College have employed the reasoning in
Gray in exactly the same manner.n 3
Although Gray is undoubtedly an important part of the "one
person, one vote" expansion of Fourteenth Amendment protection
for voting rights, it may be just as important in this context for
what it did not reach.29 4 In response to Georgia's defense that its
county unit system was analogous to the Electoral College, Justice
Douglas went to great lengths to distinguish the two, asserting that
"one person, one vote" does not apply to the federal system2 5 "We

rejected the reasoning of the district court, which held that the county unit system was permissible in theory, but unconstitutional here because the mathematical disparities exceeded those in
the federal Electoral College. See Gray v. Sanders, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962). The
Court nonetheless noted that under Georgia's system, due to the differences in population between certain counties, the residents of one county had ninety-nine times the "influence" of another county. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371. This logic is similar to the "malapportionment" argument
made against the Electoral College. E.g., Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 255.
287. Id. at 381 n.12. This language is cited by those who claim the unit rule in the Electoral
College "disenfranchises" all of the voters who do not vote for the winner. See Hoffman, supra
note 11, at 938.
288. Apparently this group brought the lawsuit because they were frustrated in attempts to
bring about a constitutional amendment. See HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 115.
289. 385 U.S. 895 (1966) (per curiam).
290. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
291. See HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 115 (discussing the arguments in Delaware case);
O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2440 (same).
292. Delaware,385 U.S. at 895.
293. See Williams v. Va. State Bd.of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622, 624 (E.D. Va. 1968).
294. HARDAWAY, supra note 12, at 113.
295. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963).
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think the analogies to the electoral college," he wrote, "are inapposite."296 The Court held that the Electoral College was different
from the Georgia system because it was explicitly provided for in
the Constitution, which "validated the collegiate principle despite
its inherent numerical inequality. ' 297 Furthermore, "[tihe only
weighing of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters
of representation, such as ... the use of the electoral college in the
choice of a President."298 The Electoral College analogy of Gray, so
appealing to unit rule challengers, was thus explicitly cut off by the
opinion itself.
That language has likewise been used to undermine subsequent court challenges to the unit rule (and perhaps the same reasoning underlay the Supreme Court's refusal to hear Delaware v.
300
New York).2 99 The next challenge was Penton v. Humphrey,
brought in federal district court in Mississippi. The court denied the
plaintiffs request for an injunction against the state's unit rule and
for a mandate that the electors cast their votes according to the
statewide percentages of popular votes. 3 01 The district court, citing
the Gray opinion's constitutional analysis of the Electoral College,
held that the "one person, one vote" doctrine did not apply to federal unit voting. 30 2 It further stated that the Supreme Court's dismissal of Delaware v. New York was a decision on the merits, bind303
ing on all federal courts.
In Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, another
federal court rejected a similar argument asking for a district
method of choosing electors, alleging that the state's unit rule "accords no representation" to a minority of the voters. 30 4 The court,
using a constitutional analysis, held that the choice of the method
was clearly within the discretion of the states, and that absent a
constitutional amendment, the unit rule was not unlawful. 30 5 The

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 380.
299. Delaware v. New York, 395 U.S. 385 (1966) (per curiam).
300. Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
301. Id.
302. Id. The district court also cited Baker and Reynolds, but the Penton case came before
Rhodes. Id.
303. Id. at 252.
304. 288 F. Supp. 622, 623 (E.D. Va. 1968).
305. Id. at 628-29. The district court's only error in its exegesis of the constitutional framework was to list Thomas Jefferson as among "the Brahmins of the Constitutional Convention."
Id. at 626. In 1787, Jefferson was in Paris, serving as Minister to France. See BOWEN, supranote
55, at 4.
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court also addressed the contention that unit voting "disenfranchised" voters by stating that the "one person, one vote" doctrine
does not have an impact on the unit rule; that the selection of electors does not "denigrate" any citizen's ballot; and that in a democratic society the majority must rule. Unless there is invidious discrimination, simply voting for the losing candidate does not constitute a deprivation of the franchise. 306 Unlike Penton, the Williams
court held that it was not bound by the Supreme Court's dismissal
of Delaware v. New York. 307 However, the Williams decision itself
would obtain a degree of precedential force, as it was reviewed by
the Supreme Court on the merits and affirmed. 308
Despite a solid line of cases holding that elections are subject
to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, no case has allowed an equal protection claim to reach the Article II power of selecting the manner of appointment by the state legislatures. The
question, however, has not been settled dispositively. There have
been very few attempts to challenge the unit rule in court since Williams. 30 9 Yet, judicial reform is still suggested by many commenta-

tors who are frustrated with the practical difficulty of amending the
Constitution. 310 Perhaps in the wake of the controversial 2000 election, a movement for reform will gain momentum. 311 If that momentum is still not enough to sustain a constitutional amendment, as
many predict, 3 12 perhaps a court challenge will once again be taken

as the only option available to a private reformer. In case that
event does come to pass, the next section briefly examines the latest
case on equal protection and voting rights.

306. Williants, 288 F. Supp. at 627.
307. Id. at 625.
308. Williams v. Va. State Bd.of Elections, 393 U.S. 20 (1969) (per curiam).
309. The only subsequent cases have had the same result-unit voting was upheld because of
the Electoral College's specific placement in the Constitution. Hitson v. Baggett, 446 F. Supp.
674, 677 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (alleging that unit voting violated the civil rights of racial minorities
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Lowe v. Treen, 393 So.2d 459, 461 (La. CL App. 1980) (trying the equal
protection argument in a state court, but rejected under the same line of federal constitutional
cases as the preceding cases).
310. See Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 253.
311. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Liberals DiscussElectoral Ov'erhaul, N.Y. TLMES, Jan. 21,
2001, at A25.
312. See Rakove, supra note 36 (%Ve may not love the Electoral College ...but that doesn't
mean we can ever get rid of it.").
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D. Bush v. Gore and.Beyond
During the fewer than forty years since Baker v. Carr, the
Supreme Court has gone from deciding whether election law is even
subject to judicial review to playing a key role in the outcome of the
presidential election itself.3 13 More than a month after the 2000
election, the Court issued the controversial Bush v. Gore opinion. 314
In addition to ending the presidential contest for practical purposes, seven justices agreed that the Florida recount raised a valid
equal protection problem. 315 Though the Court tried to cabin the
equal protection holdings to the specific facts of the case, 316 analysts
suggest that the case may indeed open up questions about the im3 17
plications of this "Newest Equal Protection."
The Court's per curiam opinion3 8 was squarely in line with
the trend of the Warren Court's constitutionalization of voting
rights and may be seen as expanding these precedents into new terrain. 319 The opinion began by restating the holding in McPherson v.
Blacker: employing a popular vote for the purposes of choosing
presidential electors is completely at the discretion of each state.
However, it continued to assert that once a state decided to hold an
election, that election must comply with equal protection principles
3 20
because the right to vote in such an election is fundamental.
The majority then continued to analyze the facts in light of
that very line of Warren Court jurisprudence, including Reynolds,
Gray, and Moore, reaffirming that any dilution of an individual's
voting power was inconsistent with the "one-person, one-vote" prin-

313.
314.
315.
U. CHI.

ISSACHAROFF, supranote 6, at 29.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-11 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 111; see also Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a.Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68
L. REV. 657 (2001) (calling the Court's Fourteenth Amendment holding "sensible and

persuasive."). But see Bush, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rhenquist, J., concurring) (arguing that revorsal
was warranted because of an Article II violation). Many commentators find the concurring opinion and its Article II rationale a more convincing justification for the Court's decision. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct" The Outcome in
Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001).
316. Id. at 109 ('Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.").

317. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 28, 48 ("There are important questions of Equal Protection and the right to vote that Bush v. Gore opens up.").
318. Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-11. The dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer agree
with the equal protection rationale of the Court. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
319. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 47.
320. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).

2001]

ELECTORAL COLLEGE UNIT VOTING

2141

ciple and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 32' Wielding this
concept of a fundamental right to require strict scrutiny, the Court
held that the recount mechanisms did not satisfy equal protection
requirements because of the alleged arbitrariness inherent in the
lack of specific standards. 22 The Court felt that equal protection
was being denied because the differing standards caused the voters
in different geographic areas of the state to be treated differently
32
and possibly to have their votes "diluted." 3
The Court further hinted that "uniformity" would have prevented the equal protection problem. 324 It concluded that the recounts did not comply with the Fourteenth Amendment because
they lacked "adequate statewide standards," "practicable procedures," and "orderly judicial review." 32 Bush v. Gore expands on the
"one person, one vote" precedents by extending the doctrine beyond
the mere structures and procedural designs of elections to include
the actual management of the election itself.326 The next logical
question is what exactly will now be required to ensure an equally
3 27
weighted vote.

Opponents of the unit rule may see some support for their
cause in the equal protection reasoning of the opinion. Bush v. Gore
supports the notion that the Constitution requires voters to be
treated equally and seems to hold the "one person, one vote" principle to require the vigorous scrutiny of presidential election practices at the micro-level. 328 While not explicitly citing Rhodes, it reaffirms the principle that Article II cannot be isolated from the Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps suggesting an even greater reach for
the Equal Protection Clause than before.3 2 It certainly seems plausible to argue that given the high degree of equal protection required by Bush v. Gore to ensure that citizens' votes are not
weighted differently,330 and the fact that the Court used that re-

321. Id. at 105-07.
322. Id. at 105-06.
323. Id. at 107.
324. Id. at 109.
325. Id. at 110.
326. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 47.
327. Id. at 48.

328. Id. at 47; see also Jack MKBalkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Beween Law and
Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1426 (2001) ("The majority's equal protection argument... extends

the principle of 'one person, one vote' from the question of how districts are apportioned before
the election to the question of how the votes are tabulated after the election.").
329. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
330. Bush v. Gore actually analogizes better to the "malapportionment" argument, by focusing on the weighing of votes, than it does to the "disenfranchisement" argument. See id. But
since the open question is whether its application of the Fourteenth Amendment to Article H
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quirement to strike down a state's election procedure in an Article
II presidential election, 331 it could also be proper to enjoin a state
from employing a unit voting practice for selecting electors.
Nevertheless, the argument against the unit rule, even after
Bush v. Gore, will still likely be unsuccessful. The Court's recapitulation of the McPherson v. Blacker holding, before it launched into
its analysis of equal protection and the Warren Court voting rights
jurisprudence, undercuts the argument. As far into Article II as it
may reach, any notion that the Fourteenth Amendment could extend far enough to reach a state's discretion to choose the manner
of selecting its electors is not supported by Bush v. Gore.3 32 The
Court takes care to note that "the State legislature's power to select
the manner for appointing electors is plenary" and that even though
the Equal Protection Clause applies when a state chooses to have
an election, the state still has a right to "take back the power to ap333
point electors" in the legislature.
In the end, it appears unlikely that a court challenge to the
unit rule would be successful. However, such a possibility still exists, especially while there is still uncertainty over exactly how
courts will deal with the Bush v. Gore interpretation of equal protection.
V. CHALLENGING THE UNIT RULE IN CONGRESS: THE STATE
SOVEREIGNTY BARRIER
Having caused much controversy during the intervening two
centuries since the Philadelphia Convention, the Electoral College
continues to be an integral part of the constitutional system, as the
2000 election so bluntly demonstrated. 334 We can expect renewed
calls to change the system, including the unit rule. 335 Given the
likelihood that a constitutional amendment will not pass, this Note
in Part IV discussed the issues facing a legal challenge to a state's
use of the unit rule. Part V will examine the possibilities for legislation by Congress.

practices extends to the Electoral College, a plaintiff could feasibly make either argument (or
both, as some of the cases have done). See, e.g., Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 288 F.
Supp. 622, 624 (E.D. Va. 1968).
331. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
332. Id. at 103-04.
333. Id.
334. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 1.
335. See Electoral College Faces the Future,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at A35.
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Assume for the purposes of this Part that a reformer introduces a bill in Congress that specifically prohibits the use of the
unit rule, but does not prescribe which method of choosing electors
the states must use. 336 First, a challenge needs to surmount the
hurdle posed by state sovereign immunity. This sticking point is
largely ignored by the scholarship on the Electoral College. But
given the complex web of state interests that informed the original
compromise, as discussed above, 33 and especially with the Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence on state sovereignty, 338 it is an important hurdle for any federal legislation, and one that congressional
action against the Electoral College could probably not clear.
A. FederalAuthority: The Tenth Amendment and State Sovereignty
Congress's authority to legislate is limited only to those subjects where it has a valid grant of power. 339 One of the reasons this
Note undertook such a close reading of the records of the Constitutional Convention 340 is because the creation of the Electoral College
is but one chapter in the larger narrative of how the Constitutional
Convention provided for the ordering of the respective powers of the
state and national governments. While the agreement required the
states to cede more authority than they had previously possessed, it
left them with a "residual and inviolable sovereignty" that operates
not only in elections and representation arrangements, but also as
the main principle that determines the scope of federal power. 1
Therefore, any attempt in Congress to preclude states' use of the
unit rule will have to comply with the Tenth Amendment and the
3 42
dual sovereignty enacted by the Constitution.

336. This argument will put aside any political assessment of the likelihood of such legislation being enacted into law. Since such legislation has been suggested, it is valuable to analyze
the legal issues it would raise. See O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2447.
337. See supraPart II.

338. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
339. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

340. See supra Part II.
341. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 213 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This

phrase has been quoted in many of the recent Supreme Court decisions favoring state sovereignty. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
919 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
342. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Govern-

ment."). Most scholarly commentary on the Electoral College simply proceeds to this policy discussion of whether Congress should legislate, without considering that the proposals have to
pass the high bar of sovereign immunity. E.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2447 (calling for
congressional legislation banning state use of the unit vote).
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1. Congress's Limited Power to Legislate
The Tenth Amendment,34 3 by expressly reserving to the
states all attributes of sovereignty not expressly given to the national government, has been held to embody the principles of federalism that limit the scope of Congress's lawmaking power. 34 4 If the
legislation is not made pursuant to a specifically enumerated
power, Congress's enactments are not constitutional. 345 Therefore,
any attempt by Congress to alter the state practices in the Electoral
College must avoid infringing on any prerogatives of the states. As
discussed below, several Supreme Court rulings of the last ten
years have read the Tenth Amendment to invalidate federal laws
that encroached on the states' sphere.
The Court ruled in 1992 that a congressional act requiring
states to accept ownership of radioactive waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress was a violation of the Tenth
Amendment. The case, New York v. United States,346 commenced a
trend towards upholding state sovereignty against federal regulation. Significantly, it read the Tenth Amendment to be a confirmation of the overall federal structure of the Constitution. 47 Therefore, congressional legislation has to pass scrutiny from two directions. It not only has to be a valid exercise of power, pursuant to an
affirmative grant by the Constitution, but it also has to refrain from
invading any state prerogatives.3 48 In New York, the Court found
that regulating radioactive waste would have been permissible by
49
either the states or by Congress under the Commerce Clause.
But, here, Congress actually directed the states to regulate it, and

343. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.

344. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (noting that, while the Driver's Privacy Pro.
tection Act (DPPA) was valid under Congress's Commerce Clause power, the Tenth Amendment
does contain principles of federalism that limit congressional legislation to those subjects expressly granted to the federal government in the Constitution).
345. Most enumerated powers are found in Article I (e.g., Commerce Clause, Necessary and

Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8), and there are others scattered around the Constitution.
Significant to this discussion are the Article II, section I power to "determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they give their votes," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, and the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
346. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
347. Id. at 156-57.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 159.
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even prescribed the substance of the regulations. 350 The Court found
that this effectively "commandeered the legislative process of the
states" in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 3 1 Noting that
"[s]tates are not mere political subdivisions of the United States,"
the Court held that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the
352
states to enact" a federal directive.
The 1997 case of Printz v. United States3 53 further strengthened this understanding of the Tenth Amendment's protection of
state sovereignty. In Printz,the Court invalidated a provision of the
Brady Act, 354 enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, that re-

quired state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 355 After discussing the general principles of state sovereignty in the constitutional
structure, the Court applied the logic of New York and found that
the provision violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing state executive officials to administer the federal program, noting that the law
operated to "compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty."3 56 Though the dissent claimed that it was valid under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 357 the majority held that it was not
"proper" because it invalidly intruded on the sovereignty of the
states.

358

Given the clear Article II textual commitment to the state
legislatures of the right to choose the manner of appointing electors, 3 59 any legislation that impinges on the states' discretion to use

the unit rule would seem to run into this very same Tenth Amendment problem. For example, in 1968, a prominent legal scholar suggested that to prevent a "faithless elector" from casting a vote
against the state's plurality winner, Congress should enact a law,
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 360 binding electors to

350. Id. at 168. Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress could have pre-empted state regulation in the area, but chose not to, opting instead for laws compelling the states to act. Id.; U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
351. New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).

352. Id. at 188.
353. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
354. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
355. Printz,521 U.S. at 933.
356. Id. at 932.
357. Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 923.
359. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,d. 18. Pursuit of such a plan under the Fourteenth Amendment
would be less likely to be stopped by these obstacles, though not with any certitude. Beverly J.
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vote in accordance with the popular vote. 36 1 While that clause is
certainly a valid font of authority, this type of legislation would entail commanding the state legislatures to pass a particular law, in
violation of New York. Or, if it purported to act directly on the electors themselves, it would run afoul of Printz, since it has been established that the electors are indisputably state, and not federal,
3 62
officials.
The very same logic would apply to any attempt to legislate
against the states' discretion to employ the unit rule in exercising
their right to determine the manner of choosing electors. The
Court's current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence strongly militates
against any abridgment of a state's sovereign authority as it is set
forth in the Constitution. 363 Certainly none of Congress's Article I
powers would suffice to direct state legislatures to enact a certain
policy. The only possible avenue would be under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 364 which authorizes Congress to make laws
to enforce the other provisions of the amendment.8 65 Even though
the Equal Protection Clause, in light of the "one person, one vote"
case law described above,3 66 might currently be the intuitive choice
for enacting such legislation in the first place, this still might not
ensure that the legislation would circumvent the Tenth Amendment
sovereignty problem. 367 First, there is the unresolved issue, however
unlikely, of whether the Fourteenth Amendment can supersede the

Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the PopularVote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 74041(1996).
361. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution,Congress, and PresidentialElections, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 32-36 (1968).
362. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 223 (1952); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383, 388
(8th Cir. 1937) ("Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than.., the
people of the states when acting as electors of representatives in congress.").
363. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
364. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
365. The federal-state balance enacted in the Constitution is only alterable by subsequent
amendments, such as the Fourteenth. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).
366. See supra Part IV.B.
367. One proposed congressional statute contained a section stating that it "specifically bans
the use of statewide unit vote counting for presidential elections." O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at
2447. The article containing this proposal, published a month after the New York ruling, did not
discuss whether simply proscribing one particular method as a Fourteenth Amendment violation
should be seen differently, for Tenth Amendment purposes, than an affirmative direction to
choose a particular method. Id. New York, however, focuses not on the specific requirements of
the regulatory scheme, but on the simple fact that because it required the state legislatures to
enact one, it "commandeers the legislative processes of the States." New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
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unequivocal grant of constitutional power to the states under Article 11.368 Second, even where the Congress might otherwise validly
legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
recently placed severe constraints on its ability to infringe on state

sovereignty in doing S0.369
2. Alternative Legislative Possibilities
The Fourteenth Amendment remains as the only possible
constitutional authority available to reformers who want Congress
to legislate on the unit rule. Though this Note analyzes the substantive question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment suffices to
allow Congress to legislate without an impermissible intrusion on
sovereignty, 370 it is worth noting that there are twvo alternative possibilities for Congress to effect change, largely unnoticed in the
scholarship, without implicating the Tenth Amendment. First, the
Twenty-Third Amendment, which gave the people of the District of
Columbia the right to choose electors in presidential elections, provides that the appointment shall be "in such manner as the Congress may direct" (parroting the language of Article II).rl Therefore, Congress has the power to abolish the unit rule in the nation's
capital and implement one of the alternative methods, such as a
proportional allocation of electoral votes.
If simply setting the example is not enough, and what is desired is a plan to encourage uniformity with reduced collective action problems, Congress could provide an incentive through its
spending power.37 2 In South Dakota v. Dole,37 3 the Court held that
"Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds" to

368. See Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections. 288 F. Supp. 622, 629 (E.D. Va. 19G8).
369. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (restricting application of fed-

eral age discrimination statute to states). This issue is discussed in detail infra Part V.B.
370. See infra Part V.B.
371. U.S. CONSr. amend. XXIII, § 1.

372. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 CThe Congress shall have Power... [to] provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. . ."); see also New York, 505 U.S. at

166 (indicating that the goals of the invalidated legislation could have been achieved though
means short of outright coercion, such as holding out incentives to the states "as a method of
influencing a State's policy choices" consistent with federal interests); Lynn A. Baker, The
Spending Power and the FederalistRevival, 4 CHAP. L REV. 195. 196 (2001) (calling for judicial
review of congressional action under the Spending Clause, because "[hie matter how narrowly
the Court might read Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and [Slection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and no matter how absolute a prohibition the Court might impose on Congress's 'commandeering' of state and local officials, the states will be at the mercy of Congress so
long as there are no meaningful limits on its spending power").
373. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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achieve federal goals. 3 74 The conditions must be related to the purpose of the federal spending. 375 In the wake of the controversy over
the 2000 election, politicians of all stripes are calling for legislation
to provide massive grants to states in order to support modernized
and standardized voting equipment. 376 Pursuant to a stated federal
interest in "electoral uniformity," Congress could try to condition
these grants on state legislatures implementing the "manner" of
selecting electors favored by Congress. While these proposals do not
enact the complete overhaul desired by some reformers, 377 perhaps
incremental change would be the best approach in light of the difficulty of amending the Constitution.
B. Back into Court: The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign
Immunity
The federalist structure of the Constitution also presents another preexisting obstacle to any legislative or judicial involvement
in the Electoral College and the unit rule-sovereign immunity.
Congress's legislative power regarding the states depends on the
federal government's ability to enforce those laws in court. 378 The
doctrine of sovereign immunity operates to prohibit lawsuits by individuals against the federal or state governments. 379 What this
means in the context of the Electoral College is that there is a presumption against court jurisdiction for a suit seeking to enforce a
federal statute proscribing the unit rule as a method for choosing
electors-a fact that is ignored in the literature. 380 It would be im-

374. Id. at 206.
375. Id. at 208. The spending at issue in Dole was a federal statute directing the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a twenty-oneyear-old drinking age. Id.
376. See, e.g., Steps for Ballot Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A22; NAVL COMM'N ON
FED. ELECTION REFORM, To ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 69

(2001) (advocating that "the national government should become a limited partner in financing
our federal election system").

377. It is curious that these two possible alternatives have been completely overlooked by the
scholarship. Perhaps that is due in part to a preference among writers to focus on the larger,
more comprehensive suggestions for reform. At any rate, conditional spending by Congress could
help reduce the collective action concerns that might prevent a willing state from exercising its
Article II discretion, and encourage other states to serve as "laboratories" for Electoral College
experiments. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
378. Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1015 (arguing that the recent sovereign immunity decisions
sharply limit Congress's power to enforce legislation that it may otherwise validly enact).
379. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
380. Articles that deal with challenges to the Electoral College tend to go directly to analysis
of the substantive claim itself (usually the Fourteenth Amendment), without making this neces-
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possible to legislate effectively against the unit rule without being
able to enforce it against the state in its sovereign capacity. 38
There are exceptions that can be pursued, but the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence has strengthened state sovereign immunity in recent years, even more than it has the Tenth Amend38 2
ment.
1. Exceeding the Limits of Authority
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that extends back to the
common law tradition, which posits that immunity from private
suits is a central aspect of sovereignty. 38 3 Using a "framers' intent"
analysis, the Supreme Court has pronounced that the idea that the
states would be immune from suit by private individuals was universally held when the Constitution was ratified.3 4 Whether or not
the expectation was that the states would retain sovereign immunity in the federal system, the Supreme Court's reading of Article
III concluded that they did not. In 1793, it allowed a South Carolina
citizen to bring suit against the State of Georgia.m The holding of
Chisholm v. Georgia,that states were not constitutionally immune
from lawsuit, "fell upon the country with a profound shock. " 3s 6 The
controversy that attended the Chisholm reading of the federal judicial power was so great that the Eleventh Amendment to the Con-

sary logical step of clearing the sovereign immunity hurdle. See, e.g., Josephson & Ross, supra
note 22, at 162-64; Williams & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 252-55; O'Sullivan, supra note 23,
at 2442-44.
381. Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1012.

382. The Court issued its latest decision in the post-Seminole Tribe line of cases in February
of 2001. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding that Congress did not identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled to support
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment).
383. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414
(1979) ('The immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been
enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries.")).
384. Id. at 716-19. The Court cited much contemporary opinion to support this conclusion,
including the ratification debates, and The FederalistPapers.See THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent .... Unless therefore, there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States. ...).
Previously, the Court had asserted that "[t]he Constitution never would have been ratified if the
States and their courts were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself" Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 n.2
(1985).
385. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 DalL) 419 (1793) (holding that the literal text of Arti.
cle III granted jurisdiction over controversies "between a State and the Citizens of another
State").
386. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720.

2150

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2099

stitution, the first amendment since the Bill of Rights, was passed
38 7
in response.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State. . . ,"388 It has long been held to affirm
that the states are sovereign entities in the federal system and that
"[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
' 389
the suit of an individual without [a state's] consent.
Since 1996, however, the Court has handed down a series of
decisions that aggrandize the effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine even further. The first of these cases was Seminole Tribe v.
Florida.390 In Seminole Tribe, a suit was filed against the State of
Florida to compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, which in part provided that a tribe may sue a state in federal
court to compel good-faith negotiations toward a compact to allow
gambling activities. 391 The Court held that this provision was an
unconstitutional abrogation of Florida's sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court. 392 Though the Act was passed pursuant to an
enumerated power-the Indian Commerce Clause 393-the Court
overturned an earlier case 394 that held Congress could validly abrogate sovereign immunity under Article 1.395 "The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III," the Court
stated, "and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitu396
tional limitations placed on federal jurisdiction."
Seminole Tribe articulated a clear test for when a state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from a lawsuit may be

387. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934). The Court has repeatedly held that it
was Chisholin, not the Eleventh Amendment, that deviated from the original understanding that
the states' traditional immunity should be preserved, and that the Amendment was intended to

restore, not change, the constitutional understanding of sovereignty. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 722;
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
388. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
389. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1889) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander

Hamilton)).
390. 517 U.S. at 44.
391. Id. at 49.
392. Id. at 72.
393. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
394. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Clause was sufficient grounds to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
395. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (overruling Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
396. Id. at 72-73.
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overcome. 397 Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity
if (1) it has unequivocally expressed its intent to do so in the statute
under which the suit is brought, and (2) it has acted pursuant to a
valid exercise of legislative power. 398 Furthermore, in a 1999 case,
the Court rejected the notion that there could be an implied waiver
of immunity on the part of a state. 399 Since the Court held that Article I is not a valid exercise of legislative power for sovereign immunity purposes, there are accordingly few bases for a suit against
a state to proceed. The exception, once again, is the Fourteenth
Amendment, with its Section 5 enforcement power. Because the Reconstruction Amendments were enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment and had "fundamentally altered the balance of state
and federal power struck by the Constitution," Congress might be
able to use the Fourteenth Amendment to validly abrogate state
400
sovereign immunity.
The Court has had even more to say about sovereign immunity since Seminole Tribe. Even though neither Article III nor the
Eleventh Amendment extend state sovereign immunity to state
courts by their text, Alden v. Maine held that states may not indeed
be subject to suit in their own courts. 01 Even though this principle
does not directly appear in the text of the Constitution, the Court
held that immunity from suit in the sovereign's own courts is so
fundamental an aspect of sovereignty 4 2 that it is an inseparable
part of the residual sovereignty the states brought with them into
the Union. 403 In Alden, the Court went beyond the Eleventh
Amendment as the source of state sovereignty, reasoning that the
doctrine derives not so much from the Amendment, but "from the
structure of the original Constitution itself," and that the scope of

397. Id. at 55.
398. Id.
399. College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675

(1999). The Court stated that it would only find a waiver of sovereign immunity if a state voluntarily invokes the courts jurisdiction, or if there is a clear declaration of intent to waive on the
part of the state. Id.
400. Id. at 672; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). However, the Court's post-Seminole Tribe decisions have se-

verely restricted even the Fourteenth Amendment exception. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents.
528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000) (restricting application of federal age discrimination statute).
401. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
402. Id. at 745 ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.")
(quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 U.S. (1 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
403. Id. at 748 CThe principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional design 'thus
accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation.'") (quoting Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
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immunity is determined by "fundamental postulates implicit in the
40 4
constitutional design."
2. The Limited Fourteenth Amendment Exception
Even though Seminole Tribe left open the possibility of abrogating state sovereign immunity by legislating pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, subsequent decisions have severely limited this already narrow exception. 4 5 In a 2000 case, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court expounded on just what it required
for a valid Fourteenth Amendment abrogation of sovereign immunity. 40 6 Following the reasoning of City of Boerne v. Flores,40 7 the
Court averred that "Congress cannot 'decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States' [because] ....
[i]t has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 40 8 To determine
whether a congressional enactment qualifies as appropriate remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause, the Court adopted the test from Flores, stating that "there
must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."40 9 In
other words, to sue a state (e.g., over unit voting in the Electoral
College), the legislative authority has to provide the party with not
just a clear statement abrogating sovereign immunity, but an actual remedial measure of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
410
as determined by the courts.

404. Id. at 728-29; see also Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudenceof Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1602-04 (2000) (arguing that in Alden, the Rehnquist Court
shifts the methodology of its federalism jurisprudence to an understanding of overall structure,
away from its previous reliance on originalism and textualism).
405. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the Violence
Against Women Act did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to permit a suit against a state to enforce its provisions); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
406. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
407. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act violated
the Constitution because it was not a valid exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
408. Kirnel, 528 U.S. at 81 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 519).
409. Id. at 63 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 520). Applying that "congruence and proportionality" test, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate
state sovereign immunity. Id. at 83.
410. Id. at 81.
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Since the Court does not permit Congress to determine the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
states, it becomes difficult for that body to pass any meaningful legislation. It is limited to "enforcing" the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41' Even since Kirnel, there have been two subsequent cases where the Court has struck down legislation enacted
to prohibit discrimination pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
because the abrogation of sovereign immunity was not "congruent"
or "proportional" to the discrimination it was trying to prevent. 412 In
United States v. Morrison, the Court held that the Violence Against
Women Act, while perhaps enacted to remedy a valid Fourteenth
Amendment type of discrimination, was not sufficient to allow a
suit to enforce the Act against a state."13 The most recent in this
line of cases was decided in February 2001. In Board of Trustees v.
Garrett, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment basis of
the Americans with Disabilities Act was insufficient to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 414 The Court made this ruling despite a
large legislative record amassed by Congress purporting to demon415
strate a pattern of discrimination in the states.
Constitutional sovereignty does not operate, however, to immunize states from lawsuits brought by other states or by the federal government. These possibilities are nowhere precluded by the
text of Article III or by the Eleventh Amendment. In fact, the Court
has recently observed that "[i]n ratifying the Constitution, the
States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal
Government." 416 In the 2001 Term, the Court in Kansas v.Colorado
confirmed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a state from
bringing an action against another state under the Court's original
jurisdiction. 417 Delaware once tried to challenge the unit rule in the
Electoral College this way, by suing New York under the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to hear cases between states, but the
4 18
Court declined to hear the suit.

411. Id.
412. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
626 (2000).
413. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
414. Garrett,531 U.S. at 356.
415. Id.
416. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
417. 121 S. Ct. 2023, 2028 (2001) (holding that Kansas may invoke the Court's original juris-

diction in a suit against Colorado, as long as it is the real party in interest, and is not simply
acting as an agent for one or more of its citizens).
418. Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966). This has been explained as a tactic meant
to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Article IIl, Section 2. U.S. CONSr. art.

2154

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2099

The bottom line of the sovereignty doctrine, however, is that
it is now extremely difficult for Congress to pass or enforce any legislation, even based on its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, that operates against the states. 4 19 This robust
doctrine has several implications in the context of a challenge to
unit voting by the states in the Electoral College. By protecting the
states from lawsuits without their consent, the current reading of
the Eleventh Amendment makes such a challenge an uphill climb,
for the only way to enforce a statute limiting the unit rule is to sue
a state, and a state would be unlikely to consent to such a suit. It
effectively eliminates any constitutional basis for legislating
40
against the unit rule other than the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, as Kimel demonstrates, the Fourteenth Amendment
has become very limited in its ability to overcome sovereign immunity, in spite of the "fundamental right" established in the "one per42 1
son, one vote" doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1787, the Constitutional Convention met to decide how to
structure the new nation. The plan that was designed, ratified, and
implemented was not the product of one grand vision, but of a series of compromises that produced a structure capable of creating
an effective national government while preserving the sovereignty
of the respective states. This compromise is reflected in the Electoral College system that provides for a state role in electing the
chief executive. Then-Senator John F. Kennedy opposed a 1956 plan
that would have abolished state unit voting, stating that the constitutional balance achieved in the Electoral College represented "a
whole solar system of governmental power." 422 In 2000, that system
once again came under scrutiny for the results it produced. The

III, § 2 ('In all cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction"). See O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 2440-41. It is also possible, however, that it was
a tactic to avoid a sovereign immunity problem.
One is left to wonder why, if Delaware felt so strongly, it has never chosen to exercise its Article II rights to change the method of appointing the three electors from Delaware. Perhaps they
might have had collective action concerns that, if they were to jettison the unit rule, they might
lose influence in presidential elections if other states did not follow suit.
419. See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1015; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection
by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,
443 (2000).
420. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996).
421. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000). See supra Part IV for discussion of the "one person, one vote" doctrine.
422. 102 CONG. REC. 5150 (1956) (statement of Sen. John F. Kennedy).
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original balance of federal and state interests, and the importance
of voting rights, both greatly evolved during the intervening two
centuries, but not enough to erode the original structure. In spite of
the strength of the modern Equal Protection Clause and its application to electoral practices, a state's discretion to use the unit rule in
appointing electors cannot be overcome by a court challenge or by
legislation. Only unilateral state action or a constitutional amendment will effect any change in the states' use of unit voting in the
Electoral College.
Matthew J. Festa*
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